Section 4: Criminal Law & Procedure by Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Supreme Court Preview Conferences, Events, and Lectures
1997
Section 4: Criminal Law & Procedure
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1997 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview
Repository Citation
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School, "Section 4: Criminal Law & Procedure" (1997). Supreme Court
Preview. 69.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/69
STATES GET CONTROL OF SEX OFFENDERS
POST-PRISON CONFINEMENT OK'D
The Record, Northern New Jersey
Tuesday, June 24, 1997
Aaron Epstein, Knight-Ridder News Service
The Supreme Court, boosting the nationwide
campaign to protect the public against sex
offenders, on Monday allowed states to keep
convicted rapists, pedophiles, and other violent
sexual predators locked up even though their prison
terms are over.
In a 5-4 decision, the justices upheld a Kansas
law that allows such offenders to be confined
possibly for an indefinite period _ if they are found
to suffer from a "mental abnormality" and are
likely to commit other sex offenses if freed.
Civil libertarians see such laws as licenses for
"lifetime preventive detention."
But the court's conservative majority, led by
Justice Clarence Thomas, found that the Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act of 1994 provides for
civil commitment, not further criminal punishment.
Therefore, Thomas reasoned, it did not violate
the Constitution's bans on punishing people twice
for the same crime (double jeopardy) or on
enacting statutes that increase the penalty for a
previously committed crime (ex post facto laws).
Thomas also said that state legislatures could
confine people whose mental abnormalities were
not serious enough to classify as a mental illness,
provoking opponents of sexual predator laws to
contend the court's reasoning could justify the
confinement of repeat robbers, burglars, arsonists,
drug abusers, or even chronic shoplifters.
But Justice Anthony Kennedy, whose vote was
critical to the decision, warned state legislatures in
a concurring opinion that the court would reject
laws that were "too imprecise" or used civil
confinement as "a mechanism for retribution."
Seven other states, including New Jersey, have
similar sexual predator laws and have used them to
lock scores of violent sexual offenders in mental
institutions instead of setting them free when their
prison terms ended.
It is unclear how the decision will affect the
New Jersey law that has been used to keep
Wyckoff rapist Donald Chapman and other sex
offenders in state psychiatric hospitals after they
have served their prison sentences.
Chuck Davis, a spokesman for the state
Attorney General's Office, said the ruling would
seem to uphold the constitutionality of New
Jersey's civil commitment law. The law allows the
state to keep people against their will in a state
psychiatric hospital if they are considered mentally
ill and dangerous.
Chapman's attorney, Vincent Basile, said he
was "shocked" and "disappointed" by the decision.
"This ruling is kind of against us," he said.
But Basile said there are key distinctions
between Chapman's case and the Kansas case. For
example, he said, unlike Leroy Hendricks, the
focus of the Kansas case, Chapman has not said he
would likely commit new crimes if released from
the hospital.
Also, Basile said, state doctors have said
Chapman does not need to be institutionalized,
whereas physicians for the state of Kansas have
said Hendricks must be. Only doctors retained by
the New Jersey Attorney General's Office have
argued that Chapman should remain hospitalized,
Basile said.
Chapman, who served a 12-year prison
sentence for raping and torturing a woman in 1980,
is appealing a 1996 state Supreme Court ruling
that upheld the civil commitment law. He remains
in Trenton Forensic Psychiatric Hospital.
Had Monday's ruling struck down the Kansas
law, Basile said, "I'd be in the federal courthouse
tomorrow probably with a writ of habeas corpus,"
requesting Chapman's release.
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Kansas Attorney General Carla Stovall and the
attorneys general of 37 other states argued that the
Kansas law was a reasonable method of coping
with a serious national problem.
After the Supreme Court decision Monday,
Stovall said: "I truly believe God is taking care of
the children in this country."
Sexual-predator laws are only part of the
nationwide legal attack on repeat sexual offenders.
New federal laws now require all states to
register released sex offenders with the police and
inform communities when sex offenders move in.
The community-notice provision, "Megan's Law,"
was named for Megan Kanka, the 7-year-old
Mercer County girl who was sexually assaulted
and strangled to death in 1994 by convicted
pedophile Jesse Timmendequas. He was sentenced
to death Friday.
The Kansas law was the outgrowth of a
crusade for action after Stephanie Schmidt, a
college student, was raped and strangled in 1993
by a convicted rapist who had been released from
prison.
The Kansas Supreme Court ruled the statute
unconstitutional in the case of Hendricks, 62, who
was repeatedly convicted of child molesting over a
40-year span.
After being found mentally abnormal, but not
"mentally ill," he was committed to a state mental
hospital in late 1994 as he was about to be released
after serving almost 10 years in prison for
molesting two 13-year-old boys.
A jury concluded he was likely to prey upon
young children again if he were set free. Hendricks
himself admitted that he suffers from pedophilia,
that treatment is "bull----," and that the only way
he could keep from molesting would be "to die."
The court rejected arguments that the Kansas
law unconstitutionally permitted people to be
committed even though they did not have a
medically recognized "mental illness."
Thomas said commitment laws need not use
any particular words to describe mental conditions.
Psychiatrists, in fact, are divided over whether
pedophilia may be classified as a "mental illness,"
and "it is precisely where such disagreement exists
that legislatures have been afforded the widest
latitude in drafting such statutes," Thomas said.
But the focus of Thomas' majority opinion was
that the Kansas law contains sufficient safeguards
against unjust confinement and is not punitive. Its
goal is treatment, not retribution or deterrence, he
said.
The law allows sexually violent predators, who
are reevaluated once a year, to be confined until
their mental abnormality no longer makes them
threats to others, a commitment that Thomas
characterized as "only potentially indefinite."
But Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the
dissenters, described the confinement of Hendricks
as "an effort to inflict further punishment upon
him." He focused on the finding of Kansas courts
that Hendricks had received no treatment in prison
and "essentially no treatment" at Lamed State
Hospital in central Kansas.
Staff Writer Paul Rogers contributed to this
article.
Copyright 1997
132
KANSAS PREDATOR LAW UPHELD
The Kansas City Star
Tuesday, June 24, 1997
Tony Rizzo; James Kuhnhenn; Staff Writers
Kansas can confine dangerous sexual predators for
treatment even after they complete their prison
sentences, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled Monday.
The precedent-setting opinion overturned a 1996
Kansas Supreme Court ruling and set the stage for a
rush of similar laws across the country.
"We all wrestle with what to do with these people,"
said Kansas Attorney General Carla Stovall, who
defended the law before the U.S. Supreme Court. "The
court has now given us one way to do that."
Certain sex offenders who suffer a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes them
likely to commit additional sex crimes can be held
indefinitely for treatment under the 1994 law.
Safeguards such as trial by jury and yearly reviews
of sexual offenders' mental status are included in the
law.
Outrage over the rape and murder of Stephanie
Schmidt, a Pittsburg State University student from
Leawood, led the Kansas Legislature to pass the law.
She was killed by a convicted sexual offender released
from prison. Her parents, Peggy and Gene Schmidt,
were vocal proponents of the law.
On Monday, the emotional couple, with their other
daughter, Jennifer, met Stovall at Kansas City
International Airport with a dozen red roses to
congratulate her on her victory.
"Our prayers have been answered," said a tearful
Peggy Schmidt.
She said she was proud of Stephanie because the
legal developments stemming from her death have
made the world safer for other young women.
"She's still our daughter," Peggy Schmidt said.
"She has made a difference."
Nine men are currently confined as predators in
Kansas, and proceedings are pending against at least
four others. Dozens of others are confined in a handful
of other states with similar laws.
In the decision Monday written by Justice Clarence
Thomas, five of the justices ruled that because the
Kansas law is a civil procedure and not a criminal
punishment it does not violate the Constitution. Critics
had said the law violated the Constitution on two
counts: It exposed defendants to double jeopardy; and
it created additional punishment for crimes committed
before the sexual predator law was passed.
The four dissenters - Justices Stephen Breyer, John
Paul Stevens, David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
- thought a constitutional problem existed. They said
in a dissent that the law's primary purpose was to
punish, not provide treatment, and therefore violates
the Constitution.
Joining Thomas in upholding the law were Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony
Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia.
The court also found that the Kansas Supreme
Court was wrong in finding that the law violated the
due process clause of the Constitution.
The Supreme Courts in Washington and Wisconsin
had previously upheld similar laws.
"Obviously, the court had a lot of trouble with this
case," University of New Mexico law professor James
Ellis said of the close decision that took the justices six
months to compose.
Ellis helped write the legal briefs challenging the
law on behalf of convicted child molester Leroy
Hendricks, the first man confined after the law was
passed in 1994.
Critics of the law fear that Monday's decision could
result in authorities using similar measures to
incarcerate other types of criminals under the guise of
mental treatment.
Robert Boruchowitz, an assistant public defender
from Seattle who wrote a brief filed by the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association, said the court
seemed to have ignored its own precedents.
"If you accept the idea that a state can define
anything and all as mental illness - what's to keep
shoplifting, drug use and residential burglary (from
being classified) as abnormal behavior.
... In fact, robbery has a higher recidivism rate than
rape."
Ellis said he thinks that Kennedy, the fifth and
deciding vote to uphold the law, clearly warned that
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his support would not extend to cases where similar
laws are used "as a sham or mere pretext."
Michael Allen, senior staff attorney for the Bazelon
Center for Mental Health Law, expressed concern
about the vagueness of the term "mentally abnormal."
"It creates some slippery slope problems," Allen
said. "What we said is that when you start calling these
severe antisocial-types mentally ill, then you stigmatize
everyone who is mentally ill."
Proponents of sexual predator laws say they are
needed protection against a tiny number of extremely
dangerous sex offenders.
"The kind of damage they can do to children is
irreparable and lifelong," Stovall said in a telephone
interview from Jackson Hole, Wyo., where she was
attending a convention of attorneys general.
Johnson County District Attorney Paul Morrison
called the ruling "a monumental day for the criminal
justice system in this country.
"This is a fundamental change in how we deal with
criminals," he said.
Stovall and Morrison both said they didn't believe
officials would try to extend the law to other types of
offenders. They also said that the number of sexual
predator cases filed would increase.
"There's no question the law will apply only to a
tiny fraction of the criminal population," Morrison
said. "That's the way it should be."
Stovall flew back to Kansas on Monday afternoon
after receiving word of the decision. She said that
based on the reaction of her fellow attorneys general,
"absolutely" more states will be interested in enacting
similar laws.
Wisconsin Attorney General James Doyle agreed.
"This decision gives Wisconsin a bright green light
for continuing to use our sex predator law in
appropriate cases," Doyle said.
Kansas is one of a half-dozen states to employ
similar sexual predator laws, the first of which was
enacted by the state of Washington in 1990.
"Washington has led the country in finding
appropriate ways to deal with violent sexual predators,
and Fim gratified the high court recognized that states
should be able to protect the community before
violence occurs," said Washington Attorney General
Chris Gregoire.
Doyle and Gregoire both were attending the
attorneys general convention in Wyoming and made
their comments in written statements.
David Beatty, executive director of the National
Victim's Center in suburban Washington, D.C., said
his office had received steady inquiries about the law
from legislators and legal officials in several states.
"My guess is that the law will serve as a model for
a flurry of legislation across the country," Beatty said.
John Garlinger, a spokesman for the Kansas
Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services,
which is responsible for the care and treatment of the
committed predators, said the men took news of the
decision calmly.
"It's fair to say there was a measure of
disappointment," Garlinger said.
He said the decision would have no effect on the
current treatment program.
Staff Writer Lynn Franey contributed to this
article.
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SUPREME COURT OKs SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS
Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, June 24, 1997
David G. Savage
WASHINGTON - The Supreme Court upheld
the new wave of state laws aimed at keeping
so-called sexual predators behind bars indefinitely,
ruling Monday that these potentially dangerous
offenders may be held even after they have served
their prison terms.
The decision appears to clear away legal doubts
about new laws in California and five other states
that allow officials to keep custody
of sex criminals whose prison terms are ending.
Roughly 400 ex-offenders are being held in the six
states under the new laws.
Ruling on a case from Kansas, the court decided
on a 5-4 vote that forced confinement in a state
treatment facility is not punishment.
"Even though they may be involuntarily
confined," wrote Justice Clarence Thomas, the
"persons confined under this act are [not] being
punished."
Because the law does not impose punishment,
Thomas reasoned, it does not violate the
Constitution's bar on a double-punishment for the
same crime, or represent an after-the-fact
punishment.
Civil libertarians have complained that this and
similar laws aimed at sexual predators wrongly
cross a new threshold by confining people based on
what they may do, rather than what they have done.
"States can and should enforce long prison
terms for repeat sexual offenders," said Steven R.
Shapiro, legal director of the American Civil
Liberties Union. "But we should not allow
politicians to use mental hospitals as a place to
lock up individuals."
He denounced the high court decision, saying it
"distorts psychiatry and the laws."
But with the high court's approval, other states
are expected to pass similar measures. And Rep.
Louise McIntosh Slaughter (D-N.Y.) said she will
press Congress to pass a similar federal law.
In the past, people who were judged insane
could be committed to a state facility for the good
of themselves and the community. Until recently,
however, these so-called civil commitments have
been limited to those who suffer from a mental
illness as defined by mental health experts.
Beginning in 1990, however, several states
expanded the concept of civil confinement to cover
sex criminals, even when these persons were judged
not to have a true mental illness. Instead, the new
laws refer more loosely to people having a "mental
abnormality" or a "personality disorder" that
predisposes them to commit sex crimes.
California's law took effect on Jan. 1, 1996.
Until then, prison officials said, they had no
recourse but to release a prisoner whose sentence
was completed, even when the inmate posed a
danger to the community.
Often, repeat sex criminals were serving
relatively short sentences. Prosecutors sometimes
agreed to plea bargains with sex criminals to spare
victims difficult trials. In California, communities
increasingly protested when residents learned a sex
offender was scheduled for release within their
midst.
In Orange County, police have used the law to
publicize the whereabouts of sex offenders in
several communities.
Placentia became the first city to do so this year,
telling neighbors about twice-convicted child
molester Sidney Landau, 57, who was pressured
out of motel rooms in three cities as a result.
Landau has since been returned to prison on a
parole violation for striking a TV cameraman.
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Several weeks later, Mark W. Mahoney, who
was convicted of fondling and having oral
copulation with several boys, moved from his
Orange apartment after police announced his
residency and neighbors threatened to protest.
James Lee Crummel, 53, who has been
convicted of kidnapping, assaulting and molesting
boys, was evicted from the Newport Beach
condominium where he lived unnoticed for years
before police made his criminal history public
under the law.
More recently, sheriffs officials launched a
door-to-door campaign in Rancho Santa Margarita
to warn residents of convicted child molester
Thomas Lee Gering, 59. Officials told neighbors
that Gering "has targeted adolescent boys" but did
not reveal his exact address, hoping to avoid
widespread protests.
Under the new laws, a psychologist or
psychiatrist is hired to examine the prisoner as his
release date nears. The evaluation includes his
record of offenses. Under the California statute, if
the psychologist says an inmate has a "mental
disorder" that makes him likely to commit new
crimes, prosecutors can seek a court order to have
the prisoner confined indefinitely at Atascadero
State Hospital near San Luis Obispo.
In the case before the court, Leroy Hendricks,
62, had served a 10-year prison term for molesting
two 12-year-old boys in a hardware store. When he
was about to be released in 1994, Kansas officials
petitioned a state court to have him confined in a
new state facility.
They described Hendricks as having pedophilia,
which is a mental abnormality. He also had a long
history of sex offenses involving children. All such
crimes are deemed violent offenses, and officials
said Hendricks was likely to commit similar crimes
if released.
As a result, Hendricks was confined in the state
facility. Last year, however, the Kansas Supreme
Court ruled the law unconstitutional, leading to
Monday's decision in Kansas vs. Hendricks,
95-1649.
Joining Thomas' opinion were Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Antonin Scalia and Anthony M.
Kennedy.
In dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer said the
added confinement was "an effort to inflict further
punishment" on Hendricks and should be struck
down as an after-the-fact punishment.
Washington state passed the first such measure
in 1990. Outraged residents had demanded action
in response to the case of Earl Shriner.
Despite a 24-year history of sex crimes
involving children, Shriner was paroled by state
officials in 1989. Six months later, he sexually
mutilated a 7-year-old boy.
The boy survived, but angry lawmakers passed
the new measure to allow state officials to
indefinitely hold repeat rapists and pedophiles.
Other states with similar measures are
Wisconsin, Minnesota and Arizona.
Times staffwriter Bonnie Hayes contributed to
this report.
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COURT RULINGS ON TRAFFIC STOPS UNDERCUT
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
ABA Journal
July, 1997
Tracey Maclin
The problem with the rules on vehicle
stops always has been that they are wide open
to subjective interpretation by the police
officers applying them.
A Southern sheriff, for instance, once
explained that, back in the '60s, driving a
Volkswagen minibus with a peace sign on the
bumper was rolling probable cause that justified
stopping and searching the vehicle.
The interpretive leeway available to police
officers appears to be on the rise. While the
U.S. Supreme Court has not approved
capricious vehicle stops outright, recent rulings
will make it much easier for police to effectuate
arbitrary and discriminatory intrusions on
motorists and passengers with little, if any,
constitutional restraint.
Over the past two terms, the justices decided
a trio of traffic stop cases: Whren v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996); Ohio v.
Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996); and
Maryland v. Wilson, No. 95-1268 (Feb. 19,
1997). Together, the decisions have moved the
Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine far closer
to the views articulated nearly 20 years ago by
William H. Rehnquist, then an associate justice
on what was the Court's conservative fringe.
In 1979, Rehnquist was the lone dissenter in
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, in which the
Court struck down as unreasonable a random
license check of a motorist. Although
Rehnquist did not expressly endorse random
vehicle stops, he favored placing the burden on
the motorist to demonstrate why a random stop
was inconsistent with Fourth Amendment
principles against "unreasonable searches and
seizures."
But in the late 1990s, the Court has largely
adopted the views of Rehnquist, now chief
justice. When confronted these days with
evidence that officers target minority motorists
for traffic stops or use motorists as guinea pigs
to practice techniques for obtaining consent to
search vehicles, the Court sees no Fourth
Amendment violation, leaving motorists to fend
for themselves when confronted with the
authority and power of the police.
Consider pretext stops, which occur when
police use a traffic violation as an excuse to
stop a vehicle when the real purpose is to
investigate criminal activity for which the
officers lack objective evidence. Once a
motorist has been stopped, officers "discover"
evidence justifying a drug search or "request"
permission from the motorist for a search.
Many blacks and Hispanics persuasively
contend that police target minorities for traffic
stops as part of an ongoing effort to hunt down
illegal drugs; even officers sometimes
acknowledge doing this.
Protection for Pretext Stops
The legality of pretext stops was challenged
in Whren. Two black defendants argued that
plainclothes narcotics officers of the District of
Columbia Metropolitan Police Department
used traffic violations as an excuse to stop their
vehicle because the officers lacked objective
evidence to stop them on suspicion that they
were drug couriers.
Affirming convictions on drug charges, the
Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth
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Amendment did not bar pretext stops.
Justice Antonin Scalia explained in his
opinion for a unanimous Court that past cases
never held that an officer's motive invalidates
objectively justifiable conduct under the Fourth
Amendment. Characterizing the defendants'
legal claim as "indisputably driven by subjective
considerations," Scalia emphasized that an
officer's subjective intent in making a stop is
irrelevant under the amendment. If the police
have probable cause to believe a violation has
occurred, a stop is valid, he concluded.
Scalia dismissed as futile a test of
"objectively" reasonable police conduct.
Enforcement practices, he noted, "vary from
place to place and from time to time. We
cannot accept that the search and seizure
protections of the Fourth Amendment are so
variable, and can be made to turn upon such
trivialities."
Scalia acknowledged that the "Constitution
prohibits selective enforcement of the law
based on considerations such as race. But the
constitutional basis for objecting to
intentionally discriminatory application of the
laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment."
Although unintended, Whren practically
guarantees that minority motorists will continue
to be the targets of pretext stops.
Putting aside the obvious question of why it
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for
police to rely on race when making a traffic
stop, the Court surely recognizes the high
hurdles that confront minority defendants who
challenge convictions or sentences on equal
protection grounds.
In a landmark case, McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Court refused to find
an equal protection violation even when a
statistical analysis of Georgia's capital
punishment system indicated that race was a
significant factor in predicting which defendants
receive the death penalty.
Indeed, one month before the Court decided
Whren, it ruled in United States v. Armstrong,
116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996), that a black defendant
was not entitled to discovery to bolster his
claim of selective racial prosecution until
demonstrating that prosecutorial policy had
both a discriminatory effect and purpose.
If the Armstrong analysis is applied to
vehicle stops, as in some lower courts, the
obstacle facing a minority defendant in
succeeding on an equal protection claim is
obvious: Before discovery is permitted, the
motorist must establish that similarly situated
white drivers were not stopped, and that the
stop was motivated by a discriminatory intent.
In sum, Whren's suggestion that the equal
protection clause will protect minority
motorists from selective enforcement practices
must be viewed with considerable skepticism.
The 'Sweet Talk' Goes On
The second in the Court's recent line of
traffic stop cases is Ohio v. Robinette, decided
in November.
According to the Court, the key issue in
Robinette was whether a lawfully seized driver
must be advised that he or she is "free to go"
before consent to a vehicle search will be
deemed voluntary. The justices concluded that
no such warning is necessary to make consent
to a search reasonable.
In an 8-1 decision, the Court saw no reason
to restrain the practice of some officers who
routinely ask motorists detained for traffic
violations for permission to search their cars.
The deputy involved in Robinette had candidly
testified that, in one case, he asked for consent
because "I need the practice" of convincing
drivers to allow a search. He also stated that in
one year, he asked motorists during traffic
stops for consent to search "approximately 786
times ... give or take a few."
There are no national figures on the number
of motorists stopped, questioned and searched
by police or on how many of those searches
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turn up nothing. But figures from 1991, for
example, show that South Carolina police
found drugs in less than 15 percent of the
4,000-plus vehicles they searched. In
Washington, state troopers had almost 1 million
contacts with motorists, resulting in 458 arrests
for felony drug crimes and 1,925 arrests on
misdemeanor drug charges.
Convincing a driver to allow a vehicle search
is known as "sweet talk" among police, but a
better metaphor might be "going fishing."
Officers have discretion in deciding which
traffic violations to enforce. In some places, if
permission for a search is denied, a motorist
will be detained until a drug- sniffing dog is
brought to the scene. While some searches take
minutes to complete, others stretch into hours.
The Court, however, apparently believes this
evidence is extraneous to the Fourth
Amendment. In a view expressed in Robinette,
motorists should have the moxie to refuse an
officer's request for a search--the same officer
who is deciding whether to issue a traffic ticket.
In Maryland v. Wilson, the most recent case,
the justices gave police officers additional
discretion to order passengers out of cars
stopped for routine traffic violations, even
when an officer has no reason to suspect a
passenger has committed a crime or threatens
the officer's safety.
Twenty years ago, the Court ruled in
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977),
that officers could, without suspicion, order
drivers out of their autos during routine stops.
In Wilson, the Court was not convinced that
passengers should be treated any differently
from drivers.
After Mimms, Wilson was easy to predict.
Now it is easy to predict the Court eventually
will allow officers to detain passengers ordered
out of a car under the authority of Wilson.
After all, what is the point of ordering a person
out of a car if the officer cannot control his or
her movements? The same law enforcement
concerns that justify giving officers the power
to order people out of cars are likely to
persuade the justices to allow forcible detention
of the passenger.
The larger impact of these recent Court
rulings is also easy to predict. Although the
Court has not said random stops are allowable,
the practical effect of its rulings is to permit the
functional equivalent of random stops. Because
practically every motorist will commit a traffic
violation sometime, the probable cause
standard provides no protection against
arbitrary or discriminatory traffic enforcement.
An overly suspicious or biased officer who
lacks evidence of criminal conduct will, if he or
she watches a car long enough, always have a
reason to stop it.
In Whren, Scalia observed that Fourth
Amendment protections do not depend on the
varying procedures followed by different police
departments. It is ironic, then, that the
framework devised in the Court's recent traffic
stop cases threatens Fourth Amendment rights
by allowing stops that objectively reasonable
officers would not make and by giving police
unchecked authority to control the dynamics of
those situations.
Copyright 1997
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96-1133 U.S. V. SCHEFFER
Ruling below (CA ArmedForces, 44 M.J. 442, 60 CrL 1272):
Mil.R.Ev. 707, which categorically forbids admission of results of polygraph
examination of accused, violates Sixth Amendment's guarantee of right to
present defense.
Question presented: Does Mil.R.Ev. 707, which provides that evidence of
polygraph examination is not admissible in court-martial proceedings, amount to
unconstitutional abridgment of military defendants' right to present defense?
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CALIFORNIA MILITARY CASE: BAN ON LIE DETECTORS TO BE REVIEWED
The Associated Press
Monday, May 19, 1997
Richard Carelli
WASHINGTON (AP) _ Lie-detector tests for
decades were considered voodoo science, but the
Supreme Court agreed Monday in a California
military case to decide whether banning test
results from criminal trials violates some
defendants' rights.
Granting a Clinton administration appeal, the
justices voted to review the case of a
court-martialed airman in which the nation's
highest military court threw out a flat ban of
polygraph evidence.
Many state and federal courts have upheld
similar bans on lie- detector test results as
evidence. The justices' decision in the Air Force
case, expected sometime in 1998, could affect all
civilian courts as well.
Edward G. Scheffer was stationed at March
Air Force Base near Riverside when, in 1992, he
was court-martialed on charges of writing $3,300
worth of bad checks, using methamphetamine and
being absent without leave for 13 days.
Shortly before his legal troubles began,
Scheffer had agreed to take a polygraph test and
denied using drugs while in the military. The test
charts indicated he answered truthfully.
A urine test indicated use of
methamphetamine.
Scheffer's request to use the lie-detector test
result as evidence at his trial was denied. A
military rule, signed by President Clinton in
1991, forbids any reference to lie-detector tests in
criminal trials.
The Supreme Court last year rejected a
soldier's challenge to that rule.
After Scheffer was convicted and sentenced to
a bad-conduct discharge and 30 months in prison,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
ruled that his request to use the lie-detector test
as evidence should not automatically have been
denied.
The rule imposing a flat ban violated his "right
to present a defense because it compelled the
military judge to exclude relevant, material and
favorable evidence," the military appeals court
ruled by a 3-2 vote last September.
It ordered the military judge to decide whether
the particular evidence Scheffer sought to use is
admissible, and if so to set aside Scheffer's
conviction and sentence.
The ruling left the trial judge free, however, to
rule that the evidence is inadmissible. The judge
would have to list the reasons and an appeal
would have to be allowed, the appeals court said.
In the appeal acted on Monday, Justice
Department lawyers argued that the military
court's ruling "conflicts with judgments of state
and federal courts, which have consistently
upheld the constitutionality of rules precluding
polygraph evidence from criminal trials."
But two federal appeals courts have ruled
recently that flat bans on lie-detector test
evidence violate fair-trial rights.
Copyright 1997, The Associated Press
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JUSTICES MAY SETTLE ADMISSIBILITY OF LIE DETECTOR
ONCE AND FOR ALL
ABA Journal
August, 1997
Richard C. Reuben
In an age of technological miracles, a court case
involving the validity of lie detector tests seems almost
anachronistic.
Refusing to admit lie detector test results into
evidence is a time-honored tradition in U.S. courts. In
fact, it was just such a disputed test that gave rise to the
longstanding rule on admissibility of scientific evidence
expressed 74 years ago in Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013.
Under the Frye test, which still is widely followed,
scientific evidence may be admitted if it is based on
principles "sufficiently established to have general
acceptance in the field to which it belongs."
While the technical sophistication of today's
polygraphs is far beyond the cathode-tube stuff of the
1920s, many lawyers and judges continue to view them
as inherently unreliable and overly prejudicial. Their
concern is that the procedure does not test whether a
subject is telling the truth but measures physiological
responses to questions-which may reveal much, but not
necessarily the truth.
But this fall, the U.S. Supreme Court will consider,
in United States v. Scheffer, No. 96-1133, whether to
finally lift the barrier to admissibility of polygraph
evidence, at least in the federal courts, on grounds that
it inhibits the constitutional right of criminal defendants
to present their defenses.
The Court might see an easier path toward
admissibility in light of its 1993 decision in Daubert v.
Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 5795. There,
the justices rejected Frye's "general acceptance" test for
admissibility with a relevancy analysis contained in
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The rule
allows "opinion testimony" by a "qualified person"
concerning "scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
By introducing a new standard for admitting
scientific evidence, Daubert has made a judicial return
to the seminal question of lie detectors seem inevitable.
Several federal courts already have taken up the
question. Some, such as the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals based in Cincinnati, have remained generally
faithful to Frye by continuing to reject polygraph test
results. Most of the circuits considering the question
have by now allowed the admission of test results under
Daubert, but some still are operating under Frye-based
precedents that have yet to be challenged under Daubert.
It is this split that the Court is expected to mend
when it hears arguments early in the 1997-98 term,
which opens Oct. 6.
Testing the Right to a Defense
Scheffer, however, comes not out of any of the
circuits but out of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals.
The evidence issue is raised under Military Rule of
Evidence 707 rather than Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
But that is expected to be a distinction without a
difference, since the two sets of rules are similar.
Edward G. Scheffer, an enlisted man in the Air
Force, was court-martialed for kiting bad checks, using
methamphetamines, failing to go to his appointed place
of duty and going absent without leave for 13 days.
In defending the drug charges, Scheffer wanted to
introduce favorable results of a polygraph test requested
by the Air Force during its investigation.
A military trial judge, applying the Frye test, refused
Scheffer's request. He appealed, contending that the
absolute bar on the admissibility of polygraph evidence
contained in Rule 707 of the Military Rules of Evidence
violated his constitutional right under the Sixth
Amendment to present a defense to his criminal
prosecution.
The Court of Military Appeals agreed, removing the
bar on per se inadmissibility of polygraph test results.
"Foundation evidence for proffered polygraph evidence
must establish that the underlying theory that a
deceptive answer will produce a measurable
physiological response is scientifically valid," the court
held.
"This foundation must include evidence that the
examiner is qualified, that the equipment worked
properly and was properly used, and that the examiner
used valid questioning techniques."
As usual, the justices have many options open to
them in deciding Scheffer. But given Daubert, they
finally may decide to give lie detectors their day in
court.
Copyright (c) American Bar Association, 1997.
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HIGH COURT TO DECIDE WHETHER TO ADMIT POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE;
ENORMOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES
New York Law Journal
July 14, 1997
Gerald L. Shargel
SEVENTY-FIVE years after the lie detector test
first attracted evidentiary notice, the U.S. Supreme
Court will tackle, head on, the irrepressible issue of
whether the results of such tests are admissible
evidence.
While trial lawyers across America will closely
watch United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442
(C.A.A.F.), cert. granted, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 3093 (May
19, 1997), there is no reason to expect an Orwellian
change in the traditional trial process. If the Court
rules in favor of admissibility, the ruling, as well as its
application in the lower courts, will be both narrow and
limited.
One of the first lie detector devices was invented in
1921 by John A. Larson, an American psychologist. In
its modem application, a qualified expert interprets
physiological responses that are controlled by the
subject's autonomous nervous system. The polygraph
instrument in use today measures, during controlled
questioning, changes in blood volume and heart rate,
respiratory activity in both the abdominal and thoracic
area, as well as changes in resistance to electrical
current on the surface of the skin.
The questions put to the subject fall into three
broad categories: direct accusatory questions relating to
the matter under investigation; irrelevant or neutral
questions; and more general questions about whether
the subject has engaged in wrongdoing. The
measurement of changes in physiological responses is
recorded on moving chart paper, similar in appearance
to an electrocardiogram. See Meyers v. Arcudi, 947
F.Supp. 581 (D. Conn. 1996); see also 1 P. Giannelli &
E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence 219-222 (2d ed.
1993).
The polygraph instrument itself does not detect
lying. The analysis of the physiological changes rests
on the premise that a human being has a natural fear of
detection and that an individual will be aroused when
his or her personal well-being is threatened. See United
States v. Bellomo, 96 Cr. 430 (SDNY) (testimony of
FBI polygraph expert James Murphy, Jan 15, 1997).
Comparing the physiological responses to the direct
accusatory questions with responses to the control
questions allows the expert to determine whether the
subject is being deceptive. In short, truthful answers do
not provoke the same physiological responses as false
answers. See Meyers v. Arcudi, supra, at 585.
'Frye'
In Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923), a murder case, the court was faced with the
"1novel question" of whether it was error to exclude
expert testimony of a "deception test" that had been
performed on the defendant.
The deception test in Frye was far less sophisticated
than the modem polygraph test, measuring only
systolic blood pressure. The scientific theory, however,
was fundamentally the same. Fear of detection brought
on by conscious deception would raise the systolic
blood pressure in a curve, "corresponding exactly to the
struggle going on in the subject's mind, between fear
and attempted control of that fear, as the examination
touches the vital points in respect of which he is
attempting to deceive the examiner." 293 F. at 1014.
Finding that the deception test had not "gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs," because it had not "[crossed] the line between
the experimental and demonstrable," the Frye court
affirmed the conviction. Id. For 70 years, until the
Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), Frye was
the seminal case on the admissibility of expert opinion
evidence. The Frye test -- whether the scientific
technique on which the evidence was founded was
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community
-- became the universally recognized standard of
admissibility.
Frye has also been long cited for the proposition,
known to lawyers and lay people alike, that the results
of lie detector tests are generally not admissible in
court. Judicial hostility toward the lie detector test is
rooted more deeply than just any other evidentiary
issue about expert opinion.
At bottom, the notion of a scientific test,
particularly a test that relies on what some may see as
a gadget attached to the body by leads and wires, to
determine credibility or even guilt or innocence, can be
found abhorrent to the long-cherished and jealously
guarded jury system. Instead of deciding the case on
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"the law and the facts," any case involving issues of
credibility, particularly criminal cases, may simply
become a "battle of experts" on the question of whether
a defendant committed the act or whether she had the
requisite intent.
This threat to convention is found in the parade of
horribles cited by the Ninth Circuit in Brown v. Darcy,
783 F2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1986). There the court
expressed fear that: (1) polygraph evidence "is likely to
be shrouded with an aura of near infallibility, akin to
the ancient oracle of Delphi," (id. at 1396), thus giving
overly significant, if not conclusive, weight to the
expert testimony, (2) polygraph evidence is an opinion
regarding the ultimate issue in the case, rather than
just one relevant issue; (3) polygraph infringes on the
jury's role in determining credibility; and (4) judicial
resources will be unduly consumed based on the great
deal of testimony required in cases where polygraph
evidence is admitted. Id. at 1396-97.
Despite this kind of staunch opposition, the
polygraph test, particularly in the past decade, has
continued to knock at the courthouse door. In the years
following Frye, the test had become far more
sophisticated. No longer did it measure a single
physiological response, systolic blood pressure; it now
measured, as earlier described, multiple responses. As
sophistication grew, so did the degree of accuracy.
In a recent hearing in the Southern District of New
York, Michael Capps, director of the Department of the
Defense Polygraph Institute, testified that the Army
uses polygraph extensively. On the question of
accuracy, Capps testified: "We feel that the polygraph,
when applied by a trained, qualified examiner using a
validated technique, with correct, accurate case facts,
with a clearly definable issue, is very accurate." Capps
went on to say that the degree of accuracy "is
approaching the 90th percentile." United States v.
Bellomo, supra, 96 Cr. 430, Transcript of Proceedings,
Jan. 15, 1997, at 156. At the same hearing, it was also
determined that the polygraph examination is widely
used and accepted within the governmental, law
enforcement and intelligence communities.
If the trial process is really a search for truth, it
becomes increasingly difficult for judges to deny the
relevance of what government and law enforcement
agencies are using outside the courtroom to ferret out
the truth.
Even while the Frye test was good law, a trickle, if
not a trend, of cases allowed lie detector evidence,
albeit in carefully limited circumstances. See, e.g.,
Wolfel v. Holbrook, 823 F2d 970, 972 (6th Cir. 1987)
(polygraph result admissible if relevant "to proof
developed by probative evidence" and probative value
of polygraph result outweighs prejudicial effect and
possibility of juror confusion); United States v. Miller,
874 F2d 1255, 1261, reh'g denied, 884 F2d 1149 (9th
Cir. 1989) (polygraph may be admissible if offered for
some purpose other than correctness of its result);
United States v. Lynn, 856 F2d 430, 432-33 (1st Cir.
1988) (terms of accomplice-witness's plea agreement,
including requirement of polygraph test, may be
revealed through cross-examination by defendant to
show motive of witness to fabricate); United States v.
Gordon, 688 F2d 42, 44 (8th Cir. 1982) (polygraph
evidence admissible if parties stipulate admissibility in
advance of test); United States v. Johnson, 816 F2d
918, 923 (3d Cir. 1987) (polygraph admissible to rebut
defendant's claim that confession was coerced).
'Piccinonna'
Perhaps the most prominent of the pre-Daubert
cases was the 1989 en banc decision of the Eleventh
Circuit in United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F2d 1529
(11th Cir. 1989). In Piccinonna, the court abandoned
the per se rule against admissibility of polygraph,
finding that it was "no longer warranted." The ruling
came "[in] the wake of new empirical and scholarly
opinions which have undercut many of the traditional
arguments against admission of polygraph evidence .
." Piccinonna, 885 F2d at 1533.
Based on its analysis of existing law and science,
the Piccinonna court made polygraph admissible in the
Eleventh Circuit in two instances. In the one most
easily applied, the evidence would be admissible when
both parties stipulate in advance to the circumstances
of the test and the scope of admissibility. Id. at 1536. In
far more complicated circumstances, the test evidence
could be admitted "when used to impeach or
corroborate the testimony of a witness at trial." Id.
Three conditions precedent were crafted to define
the rule. First, the proponent of the evidence must give
adequate notice to the opposing party that the expert
testimony will be offered. Id.
Second, the polygraph testimony would be admitted
only if the opposing party were given a reasonable
opportunity to have its own expert administer a test
with the same questions. Id. The court stated that
failure to comply with the first two requirements is
reason itself to exclude the evidence. Id. These
procedural requirements provide an opportunity for
checks and balance. A party who chooses an
unqualified polygrapher, or an expert who is "paid to
pass" the subject, will not get the testimony in
evidence.
The Eleventh Circuit's final requirement is that the
"polygraph administrator's testimony will be governed
by the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id. The example
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given by the Piccinonna court is Rule 608 which states:
"Evidence of truthful character is admissible only after
the character of the witness for truthfulness has been
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or
otherwise." Thus, corroboration of a witness's
testimony by expert polygraph testimony can only be
introduced under Rule 608 if the credibility of the
witness is first attacked.
It is important to note what the Piccinonna decision
would not allow. Limiting its ruling to expert
testimony that would "impeach or corroborate a witness
at trial," the court obviously was not opening the door
to polygraph testimony relating to truthfulness of a
party who does not testify at trial. Under Piccinonna, a
non-testifying criminal defendant in a murder case, for
example, cannot mount his defense by expert testimony
that he was not deceptive when denying to the
polygrapher that he pulled the trigger.
'Daubert'
Four years after the Eleventh Circuit decision in
Piccinonna, the Supreme Court decided Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993). Daubert had nothing to do with polygraph
tests; it involved the proffered testimony of an expert
on prescription drugs and birth defects in a product
liability suit. But what Daubert did do was specifically
reject the Frye "general acceptance" test, finding that
it had been superceded by Federal Rule of Evidence
702, which contained a far more flexible standard of
admissibility. 509 U.S. at 589.
In applying Rule 702, broad discretion is given to
the trial judge to determine whether the testimony is
scientifically valid and can be properly applied to the
facts in issue. The Daubert Court recognized that there
are many factors that may come into play and set forth
an illustrative but not exhaustive list. First, a "key
question" is whether the scientific theory or technique
can be or has been tested. Id. at 593. Second, the trial
court may inquire as to whether the theory has been
"subjected to peer review and publication," although
noting that "[publication] . .. [] is not a sine qua non
of admissibility. . . ." Id. Third, the trial court should
consider the known rate of potential error. Id. Finally,
"general acceptance" may still have a bearing on the
inquiry. Id.
Although the implications of overruling Frye were
clear, Daubert did not dispel the long-established
judicial hostility toward polygraph evidence. Even in
the post-Daubert era, approximately one-half of the
states have an absolute rule barring admission of
polygraph evidence in criminal cases. A majority of the
remaining states allow polygraph evidence only when
its admission is stipulated to in advance by the parties.
Connecticut v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 (Conn. 1997). In
New York, the Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed its
prohibition against polygraph evidence. People v.
Scott, 88 NY2d 888 (1996), citing People v. Angelo,
88 NY2d 217 (1996).
Residue of Resistance
In the federal courts, where admission of expert
opinion evidence is governed by Rule 702, a strong
residue of resistance remains in the wake of Daubert.
Although Daubert virtually mandates rejection of a per
se rule excluding polygraph, skepticism abounds. See,
e.g., United States v. Elekwachi, 1997 U.S. App Lexis
6381 (April 2, 1997) (polygraph evidence is not per se
inadmissible although admission is "generally
disfavored"); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F3d 225
(9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Daubert overruled the per
se rule but "not expressing new enthusiasm for
admission"); United States v. Posado, 57 F3d 428, 436
(5th Cir. 1995) ("It is with a high degree of caution
that we have today opened the door to the possibility of
polygraph evidence in certain circumstances.").
Now, four years after Daubert, a uniform rule has
failed to emerge. The Second Circuit considers the
question of admissibility still open. United States v.
Kwong, 69 F3d 663 (2d Cir. 1995).
In another post-Daubert decision, United States v.
Scarborough, 1994 U.S. App. Lexis 19681 (6th Cir.
1994), the Sixth Circuit affirmed exclusion of evidence
relating to a polygraph taken by a key government
witness. Although stating that the Sixth Circuit had
never imposed a per se ban on polygraph evidence, the
court concluded that the test and its results could not be
used to attack the credibility of the witness. Credibility,
the court reasoned, was for the jury to decide and
polygraph could "unduly influence this credibility
determination." Id. at *7. The Scarborough court
concluded that "admission of polygraph results is the
exception, not the rule." Id.
Ruling on the same issue, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals left it to the trial court's discretion to
decide whether polygraph evidence can be used to
attack a key government witness. United States v.
Pulido, 69 F3d 192 (7th Cir. 1995).
The Connecticut Supreme Court recently ruled that
although polygraph testing satisfied Daubert's
reliability threshold, the probative value of such
evidence is always outweighed by its potential for
prejudice. Connecticut v. Porter, supra, 241 Conn. 57.
Using the same Daubert standard, other courts have
found the evidence admissible. See, e.g., United States
v. Galbreth, 908 F.Supp. 877 (D.N.M. 1995); United
States v. Crumby, 895 F.Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz. 1995)
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(admissible subject to limiting requirements); Ulmer v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 897 F.Supp. 299 (W.D.
La. 1995).
'Scheffer'
In this cloud of confusion, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces decided United States v.
Scheffer. While under investigation for a variety of
offenses, including drug use, Scheffer was asked by the
Air Force Office of Special Investigations to submit to
a polygraph examination. Scheffer agreed and the
examiner found "no deception." In light of a positive
urine test, however, Scheffer was courtmartialed. At
trial, Scheffer testified on his own behalf, placed his
credibility in issue and was accused by the prosecution
of being a liar. The defendant then sought to introduce
the favorable results of the polygraph test.
The military judge denied the request because
under Rule 707 of the Military Rules of Evidence,
polygraph testimony is inadmissible under all
circumstances. (There is no corresponding rule in the
Federal Rules of Evidence.) Alternatively, under Rule
403 of the Military Rules of Evidence (similar to Rule
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence), the judge found
that the factfinder might give the evidence too much
weight and that the proof would consume an inordinate
amount of time and expense.
Scheffer raised a constitutional claim, arguing that
Rule 707 violated his Sixth Amendment right to
present a defense because the proffered polygraph
evidence was relevant, material and favorable. In a
carefully crafted opinion that was both narrow and
precise, the Scheffer court ruled that Rule 707, as
applied, was unconstitutional, violating Scheffer's
Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. The court
made clear: "We limit our holding to exculpatory
evidence arising from a polygraph examination of an
accused, offered to rebut an attack on his credibility."
44 M.J. at 445. Explaining its ruling, the court noted
the development of a far more sophisticated polygraph
test than the "relatively crude" test used in the day of
Frye.
With guidance from the Eleventh Circuit's
Piccinonna decision, the Scheffer court granted wide
discretion to the trial court to exclude polygraph expert
testimony where the examiner's qualifications are
unacceptable; where the test was unfairly prejudicial or
poorly administered; or where the questions were
irrelevant or improper. The Armed Forces Court of
Appeals recognized that the right to present evidence
under the Sixth Amendment may be limited by "other
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." 44
M.J. at 445. "Legitimate interests" of the trial process
may be defined by the rules of evidence.
Last term, the Supreme Court granted the
government's petition for certiorari on the question of
whether the per se prohibition of Rule 707 is an
unconstitutional abridgment of a military defendant's
right to present a defense. While it may be dangerous
to predict what the Supreme Court will do, the path of
this issue does seem fairly evident. In light of Daubert
and its implicit rejection of a per se rule prohibiting
polygraph evidence, Military Rule of Evidence 707 will
be found unconstitutional and introduction of such
evidence will be governed by the rules of evidence. As
the "gatekeeper," the trial court will employ Rule 403
to exclude unreliable or unfairly obtained evidence.
The rules prohibiting hearsay will also have a
significant impact. Although courts may still have to
decide whether a criminal defendant volunteering to
take the test may admit that fact as evidence of an
innocent state of mind, it would seem that statements
made to a polygraph examiner by a non-testifying
defendant would be excluded as hearsay.
Legitimization of polygraph evidence by the
Supreme Court, even if limited, will have enormous
implications for the defense of criminal cases. The test,
with its new level of sophistication, may help identify
the innocent It may also provide powerful ammunition
for an attack on government witnesses where witness
credibility is a key issue at trial.
But it may also be that defense lawyers pushing for
admission of polygraph evidence are playing with fire.
For example, if a government witness's credibility is
attacked on cross-examination, would evidence of "no
deception" on a polygraph test be admissible to
rehabilitate the witness under Federal Rules of
Evidence 608(a)?
If Scheffer does no more than resolve the reliability
issue under Rule 702 and the constitutional
implications of excluding reliable evidence, a myriad
of evidentiary issues will still be left open. Unless the
Supreme Court reverses Scheffer, which it is unlikely
to do, the defined role of polygraph in the courtroom
will surely not be set for many years to come.
Copyright 1997 New York Law Publishing
Company
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GIERKE, Judge:
A general court-martial composed of officer members at March Air Force Base, California, convicted
appellant, contrary to his pleas, of uttering bad checks, wrongfully using methamphetamine, failing to go to his
appointed place of duty, and absenting himself from his unit for 13 days without authority, in violation of
Articles 123a, 112a, and 86, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 923a, 912a, and 886, respectively.
The adjudged and approved sentence provides for a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 30 months, total
forfeitures, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings
and sentence.
We granted review of the following issue:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE OF A FAVORABLE POLYGRAPH RESULT CONCERNING HIS DENIAL OF USE OF
DRUGS WHILE IN THE AIR FORCE.
On April 10, OSI asked appellant to submit to a polygraph examination. The OSI polygraph examiner asked
appellant three questions: (1) Had he ever used drugs while in the Air Force; (2) had he ever lied in any of the
drug information he gave to OSI; and (3) had he told anyone other than his parents that he was assisting OSI?
Appellant answered "No" to each question. The polygraph examiner concluded that "no deception" was
indicated.
Appellant's urinalysis tested positive for methamphetamine. The report was dated May 20, although local
OSI agents may have learned of the results as early as May 14.
At trial appellant asked the military judge for an opportunity to lay a foundation for the favorable polygraph
evidence. The military judge denied the request without receiving any evidence, ruling that "the President may,
through the Rules of Evidence, determine that credibility is not an area in which a factfinder needs help, and
the polygraph is not a process that has sufficient scientific acceptability to be relevant." He further ruled that
under Mil.REvid. 403, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.).
[tihe factfinder might give it too much weight, and ... there is an inordinate amount of time and expense,
especially in the cases where there may be conflicting tests, which doesn't appear to be the case here. The main
confusion of the issue; that is, the question of what the result of the polygraph was, as opposed to the question
of whether or not the accused used drugs [is another problem].
Trial counsel cross-examined appellant about inconsistencies between his trial testimony and earlier
statements to the OSI and about his lack of a "sudden rush of energy" and other symptoms of ingesting
methamphetamine. Trial counsel's closing argument urged the court members to look at appellant's credibility.
Trial counsel argued, "He lies. He is a liar. He lies at every opportunity he gets and he has no credibility.
Don't believe him. He knowingly used methamphetamine, and he is guilty of Charge II."
Appellant asserts that Mil.REvid. 707 violated his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense because it
compelled the military judge to exclude relevant, material, and favorable evidence offered by appellant. He
argues that he was constitutionally entitled to be given an opportunity to rebut the attack on his credibility as a
witness by laying a foundation for favorable polygraph evidence. The Government asserts that the Rule does
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not impermissibly infringe on the Sixth Amendment. It argues that Mil.R.Evid. 707 merely codifies all the
evidentiary prohibitions against polygraph evidence and that, even without Mil.R.Evid. 707, polygraph
evidence would never be admissible. We agree with appellant.
In Frye v. United States polygraph evidence was held to be inadmissible because it was unreliable. In United
States v. Gipson our Court held that an accused is "entitled to attempt to lay" the foundation for admission of
favorable polygraph evidence. In arriving at that holding, our Court acknowledged that Mil.REvid. 702 "may
be broader and may supersede Frye v. United States. The impact of our Gipson decision was short-lived,
however, because on June 27, 1991, the President promulgated Mil.R.Evid. 707 in Executive Order No. 12767,§ 2, 56 Fed.Reg. 30296.
Mil.REvid. 707 provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph
examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking
of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence." Unlike most military rules of evidence,
Mil.R.Evid. 707 has no counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence. It is similar to Cal.Evid.Code 351.1
(West 1988 Supp.). Mil.R.Evid. 707 "is not intended to accept or reject United States v. Gipson, concerning
the standard for admissibility of other scientific evidence under Mil.REvid. 702 or the continued vitality of
Frye v. United States."
Appellant's case presents two questions. The second is a constitutional question: Does Mil.R.Evid. 707
violate the Sixth Amendment?
Our Court entertained a direct attack on the constitutionality of Mil.REvid. We held, however, "that the
accused had no right to introduce the polygraph evidence without taking the stand and testifying consistently,
or without offering some other plausible evidentiary basis." In Williams we observed: "Thus, in the
appropriate case, the question will be whether the proffered polygraph evidence is sufficiently reliable and
necessary that its automatic exclusion violates the accused's constitutional trial rights."
Unlike Williams, this appellant testified, placed his credibility in issue, and was accused by the prosecution
of being a liar. Thus the constitutional issue is squarely presented. We hold that Mil.R.Evid. 707, as applied to
this case, is unconstitutional. A per se exclusion of polygraph evidence offered by an accused to rebut an attack
on his credibility, without giving him an opportunity to lay a foundation under Mil.R.Evid. 702 and Daubert,
violates his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. We limit our holding to exculpatory evidence arising
from a polygraph examination of an accused, offered to rebut an attack on his credibility. We leave for another
day other constitutional questions such as those involving government-offered polygraph evidence or evidence
of a polygraph examination of a witness other than an accused.
The Sixth Amendment grants an accused "the right to call 'witnesses in his favor.'" An accused's right to
present testimony that is relevant and material may not be denied arbitrarily.
The right to present evidence, however, is not unlimited but "may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." When restrictions are placed on an accused's right to
present evidence, they "may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve."
Applying the foregoing principles, the Supreme Court held in Rock that a per se rule excluding the defendant's
hypnotically refreshed testimony infringed his right to present a defense. The Supreme Court held that a
"legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to per se exclusions that may be reliable in
an individual case." While Rock concerned exclusion of a defendant's testimony and this case concerns
exclusion of evidence supporting the truthfulness of a defendant's testimony, we perceive no significant
constitutional difference between the two. In either case, the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense is
implicated.
Polygraph examinations were relatively crude when Frye was decided. Eleventh Circuit has recognized that,
"[s]ince the Frye decision, tremendous advances have been made in polygraph instrumentation and technique."
The effect of Mil.R Evid. 707 is to freeze the law regarding polygraph examinations without regard for
scientific advances. We believe that the truth-seeking function is best served by keeping the door open to
scientific advances. With respect to appellant's case, we, like the Fifth Circuit, cannot determine "whether
polygraph technique can be said to have made sufficient technological advance in the seventy years since Frye
to constitute the type of 'scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge' envisioned by Rule 702 and
Daubert." We will never know, unless we give appellant an opportunity to lay the foundation.
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Like the Court in Posado, "We do not now hold that polygraph examinations are scientifically valid or that
they will always assist the trier of fact, in this or any other individual case. We merely remove the obstacle of
the per se rule against admissibility." Foundation evidence for proffered polygraph evidence must establish that
the underlying theory--that a deceptive answer will produce a measurable physiological response--is
scientifically valid. Furthermore, we would expect evidence that the theory can be applied to appellant's case.
The foundation must include evidence that the examiner is qualified, that the equipment worked properly and
was properly used, and that the examiner used valid questioning techniques.
As required by Daubert, the military judge must be a gatekeeper and weigh probative value against
prejudicial impact in accordance with Mil.REvid. 403. We find the Piccinonna guidance apt:
[T]he trial court may exclude polygraph expert testimony because 1) the polygraph examiner's qualifications
are unacceptable; 2) the test procedure was unfairly prejudicial or the test was poorly administered; or 3) the
questions were irrelevant or improper. The trial judge has wide discretion in this area, and rulings on
admissibility will not be reversed unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown.
This was not a private, ex parte examination under unknown conditions. To the contrary, appellant proffers
a government-initiated examination by an OSI examiner. Accordingly, there would appear to be no need to
condition admissibility on having appellant examined by a polygraph examiner chosen by the prosecution.
Finally, the issues raised by the dissenting opinion warrant comment. Both Wood v. Bartholomew and State
v. Ellison involve polygraph examinations of prosecution witnesses, not the accused. Our holding, as was that
in Rock, is limited to an accused's right to lay the foundation for a polygraph examination of himself. We need
not and do not address admissibility of polygraph examinations of government witnesses or the question
whether such polygraph evidence would be constitutionally required to be disclosed under Brady v. Maryland.
Furthermore, Bartholomew involves an issue different from the one in the case before us. It is summary
disposition of a habeas corpus case, where the Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the
Court's Brady jurisprudence. The Supreme Court noted that polygraph evidence was inadmissible under
Washington state law but premised its holding on the speculative nature of the additional evidence that might
have been discovered, counsel's concession "that disclosure would not have affected the scope of his
cross-examination," and the "overwhelming" evidence of guilt. The constitutionality of the state law was not
before the Court and therefore, consistent with the Court's practice, it was not addressed.
Finally, we must comment on the dissenter's "floodgate" argument that our opinion will generate an
unreasonable burden on the services. Apart from the speculative nature of such an argument, we think that it is
just as likely that polygraph evidence will prevent needless litigation by avoiding some meritless prosecutions
as well as smoking out bogus claims of innocent ingestion. Furthermore, we are unaware of any such flood of
polygraph cases after our decision in United States v. Gipson, supra. Finally, our measure should be the scales
of justice, not the cash register.
Decision
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is set aside. The record of trial is
returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force for submission to an appropriate convening authority
for a hearing before a military judge. Appellant will be provided an opportunity to lay a foundation for
admission of the proffered polygraph evidence. If the military judge decides that the polygraph evidence is
admissible, he will set aside the findings of guilty and the sentence, and a rehearing may be ordered. If the
military judge decides that the polygraph evidence is not admissible, he will make findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The record will be sent directly to the Court of Criminal Appeals for expeditious review.
Thereafter, Article 67, UCMJ, 10 USC § 867 (1989), will apply.
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96-8400 BUCHANAN V. ANGELONE
Ruling below (CA 4, 103 F.3d 344):
Eighth Amendment is not violated by trial court's failure, despite
defense counsel's request, to instruct jury in capital case that is
should consider as mitigating factors defendant's youth, his clean
criminal record, and whether he was under influence of "extreme
mental or emotional disturbance" when he committed crime, each
of which is designated as mitigating evidence by applicable state
law and each of which was supported by evidence submitted during
sentencing hearing and discussed by defense counsel during closing
argument.
Question presented: Is Eighth Amendment right to be free from
arbitrary and capricious imposition of death penalty violated when
jury is not instructed regarding existence of statutorily defined
mitigating circumstances, despite defense counsel's request for such
instructions, and when jury charge is devoid of any reference to
concept of mitigation?
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COURT GETS EXECUTION APPEAL;
FOUR IN AMHERST WERE SLAIN IN 1987
Richmond Times-Dispatch
Saturday, April 5, 1997
Frank Green, Times-Dispatch Staff Writer
Douglas MacArthur Buchanan Jr.'s mother died of
cancer when he was 10. Within six months, his father
married a woman who had moved into the family's
double-wide trailer while his mother had been ailing.
Among other indignities, Buchanan's new family
barred him from visiting his mother's grave. Nine years
later, in a crime as inexplicable as it was horrid,
Buchanan used a rifle, pistol and knife to kill his father,
stepmother and stepbrothers.
It was a lengthy, brutal crime that ended what for
Buchanan had been a pathological family life. He is set
to be executed Tuesday by lethal injection for the Sept.
15, 1987, slayings in the tiny Amherst County
community of Naola.
Buchanan's lawyers have taken his appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court. One of his lawyers, Gerald T.
Zerkin, would not comment on whether Buchanan will
seek executive clemency from Gov. George Allen.
Virginia and Florida have each executed 39 people
since 1976. Florida has two more scheduled for later
this month. Texas, with 111, leads the country. It has
already executed two people in April and four more are
set by the end of the month.
Buchanan's trial, argues the petition now before the
Supreme Court, was not about whether he killed his
family. That much the defense concedes.
"Rather, the trial, at both the guilt and sentencing
phases, was about his state of mind at the time of the
offense and the torturous circumstances of his life and
his relationship with his family," contends the petition.
Buchanan, 29, never denied the killings. An expert
witness testified he suffered from an emotionally brutal
upbringing and acted "under extreme mental or
emotional disturbance" when he killed his family.
He had been mistreated at the hands of his father
and stepmother over the years, experts on both sides of
the case agreed. But experts for the state disagreed
about the significance of his problems and the extent to
which it lessened his culpability.
The jury and the judge decided Buchanan acted
under premeditation and sentenced him to death.
Zerkin complains that the judge did not allow the
full testimony from the expert who examined Buchanan
and interviewed his friends and family members.
He also contends the jury should have been given
more detailed instructions on mitigating circumstances
before it deliberated on whether to sentence Buchanan
to life or death.
Evidence showed that on the day of the killings,
Buchanan and his wife, Christianne Marie Buchanan,
parked on a spot on the Blue Ridge Parkway -- a short
walk from his father's house -- and discussed the
murders.
Buchanan found his father, Douglas MacArthur
Buchanan Sr., at home and shot him in the back of the
head as he walked out the doorway. Then he shot him
between the eyes.
The slaying occurred after the older Buchanan
insulted Buchanan's mother. Both his father and
stepmother worked over the years to purge the home of
any memory of Buchanan's birth mother and cut him off
from his maternal relatives.
Next slain was stepbrother Donnie, 10, whom he
shot once as he came through the door and then again
in the temple. He shot his other stepbrother, 13-year-old
Joel, twice on the porch as the youth fled. He carried
Joel inside the house and shot him a third time.
He dragged the boys into a bedroom, but Joel was
able to get up and walk back into the living room.
Buchanan then stabbed him five times in the head.
Last to die was his stepmother, Geraldine Patterson
Buchanan. She was shot with his father's handgun,
stabbed in the chest and her throat slit so severely she
was nearly decapitated. Buchanan and his wife fled and
were later arrested in New Mexico.
Christianne Buchanan is serving four life terms for
four counts of being an accessory before the fact and
encouraging her husband in the slayings.
Buchanan's execution is set for 9 p.m. Tuesday at the
Greensville Correctional Center in Jarratt.
Copyright 1997
151
BUCHANAN CASE TO BE TEST
HIGH COURT TO HEAR JURY INSTRUCTION ARGUMENT
Richmond Times-Dispatch
Tuesday, April 29, 1997
The Associated Press
The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to use a Virginia case to decide whether defendants
facing a possible death penalty are entitled to a jury instruction on factors weighing against capital
punishment.
The court said it will hear a quadruple-murderer's argument that his constitutional rights were
violated because the judge refused to give a jury instruction on evidence he presented in his effort
to avoid a death sentence.
Douglas MacArthur Buchanan was convicted in Amherst County of the Sept. 15, 1987,
shooting and stabbing deaths of his father, Douglas Buchanan; stepmother, Geraldine; and
stepbrothers, Christopher Donald, 10, and Joel Jerry, 13.
Buchanan, who was 19 at the time, admitted he killed his family. But his lawyers argued against
a death sentence on grounds of his youth, his lack of significant criminal history, and extreme
emotional disturbance resulting from alleged abuse by his father and stepmother.
Under a Virginia rule, defendants in capital cases are not entitled to specific jury instructions
regarding mitigating factors that weigh against capital punishment in their cases.
The Virginia Supreme Court upheld Buchanan's conviction and death sentence, as did a federal
judge and the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
In the appeal acted on yesterday, Buchanan's lawyers said the Virginia rule amounts to
"perpetuating the legal ignorance of capital juries."
"Capital sentencing juries cannot give effect to mitigating evidence if they do not know what
it is," the appeal said.
Prosecutors said, "The Virginia system always has allowed, as it did in Buchanan's case, for the
complete presentation of mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.
... The Constitution clearly did not require that instructions provide any further explanation of
the concept of mitigation."
Copyright 1997
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Douglas McArthur BUCHANAN, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant,
V.
Ronald J. ANGELONE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections;
Commonwealth
of Virginia, Respondents-Appellees.
103 F.3d 344
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.
Argued Oct. 30, 1996.
Decided Dec. 30, 1996.
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge:
In 1988, Douglas McArthur Buchanan, Jr., was convicted of capital murder in Virginia and sentenced to
death. After exhausting his state remedies, he petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his petition, he alleged numerous constitutional defects in the state court proceedings.
The district court denied the petition. On appeal, Buchanan presents five issues for review. After careful
consideration of his contentions and the record, we find no reversible error and affirm the district court's
disposition.
I
On the afternoon of September 15, 1987, Buchanan murdered his father, his stepmother, and his two half
brothers. The Virginia Supreme Court's opinion recounts the details of the crime.
Buchanan was charged with capital murder for the killing of "more than one person as part of the same act
or transaction." In four separate indictments, the grand jury also charged him with the first degree murder of
each victim. In addition, he was charged with four counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a murder.
Buchanan pleaded not guilty to all charges. He was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Amherst
County, Virginia. The jury found him guilty of capital murder for killing his father, four first degree murders,
and the firearm offenses. Following a separate hearing, the jury sentenced Buchanan to death for the capital
murder, to life in prison for each of the first degree murders, and to a term of imprisonment for the firearm
offenses. The circuit court imposed the recommended sentences.
Buchanan appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The court vacated the redundant conviction of first
degree murder for the killing of Buchanan's father and affirmed the other convictions and the related sentences,
including the death penalty.
Buchanan sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, which denied relief. On appeal, Buchanan
now asserts five claims, one relating to the competence of his trial counsel, three alleging errors in his trial, and
one challenging the adequacy of the Virginia Supreme Court's appellate review.
II
Buchanan's first claim is that the sentencing jury was inadequately instructed about mitigating evidence.
With regard to mitigation, the court told the jury: "[I]f you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty
is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the defendant at life imprisonment." In addition, the
statutory verdict form required the jury to indicate that it had "considered the evidence in mitigation of the
offense."
At trial Buchanan asked the court to give a more detailed instruction on mitigation. Specifically, he asked
the court to tell the jury that it should consider as mitigating factors his youth, his clean criminal record, and
whether he was "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" when he committed the
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crime. Each of these factors is designated as mitigating evidence by Virginia Code § 19.2-264.4. During the
sentencing hearing Buchanan submitted evidence supporting each factor, and Buchanan's counsel was
permitted to discuss the factors in his closing argument.
Buchanan now argues that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury about the specific mitigating factors
supported by his evidence violated his constitutional rights in two ways. His first argument rests on the Eighth
Amendment. In his view, the trial court's nonspecific instruction did not appropriately channel the jury's
discretion so as to avoid an arbitrary or capricious outcome.
The Eighth Amendment requires that a capital sentencing jury's discretion be "guided and channeled by
requiring examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty, thus
eliminating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its imposition." To accomplish this purpose, a capital
sentencing jury must be properly instructed. However, the Eighth Amendment does not require states to adopt
specific standards for instructing juries on aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Guided by those constitutional principles, this court has previously analyzed and rejected the argument now
asserted by Buchanan. In Clozza v. Murray, we held that Virginia's death penalty scheme survives
constitutional scrutiny, despite its "failure to instruct the jury on statutory mitigating factors." In addition, this
court has reviewed and approved the constitutionality of jury instructions, used in other Virginia death penalty
cases, that were essentially identical to the instructions contested in this case.
In its verdict, the jury, as required by Virginia Code § 19.2-264.4, certified that it had "considered the
evidence in mitigation of the offense." In Jones, we concluded that "[bly allowing the jury to consider all
relevant mitigating evidence, [Virginia's sentencing] procedure ... satisfied the requirement of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of individualized sentencing in capital cases." In light of this precedent, Buchanan's
Eighth Amendment claim must fail.
In
The second claim advanced by Buchanan is that the trial court impermissibly limited his ability to present
mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. This claim is based on the trial court's exclusion of hearsay
testimony offered by Buchanan's expert witness, Dr. Robert Brown.
Dr. Brown was Buchanan's principal mitigation witness. In preparation for trial, he performed a
psychological evaluation of Buchanan and extensively investigated his personal and family history. As part of
his investigation, he interviewed many of Buchanan's friends and relatives.
Dr. Brown testified at trial that, in his expert opinion, Buchanan was under extreme emotional stress at the
time of the killings. He went on to testify extensively about the evidence that supported his conclusion.
However, the trial court did not permit him to repeat some of the statements made to him during the interviews
he had conducted. Sustaining the prosecution's hearsay objection, the judge excluded all such statements made
by individuals who had not appeared at trial. Although the statements were excluded, the judge offered to stay
the proceedings and allow the individuals who had made the statements to testify in person. Buchanan
declined the offer.
Buchanan insists that application of the hearsay rule in this case violated his constitutional right to present
mitigating evidence.
Based on the "unique circumstances" present in Green, the Court held that Georgia's admittedly proper
application of its hearsay rule during the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial violated the Due Process
Clause. In that case, the trial court excluded an out-of-court statement of a man who had already been
convicted of capital murder for his role in the killing for which the defendant was being tried. The excluded
statement, made spontaneously to a close friend, amounted to an admission that the declarant alone was
responsible for the killing. The Court found that "[tlhe excluded testimony was highly relevant to a critical
issue in the punishment phase of the trial, [citation omitted], and substantial reasons existed to assume its
reliability." Under those circumstances, the Court held that " 'the hearsay rule may not be applied
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.' "
The exclusion of the hearsay statements offered by Dr. Brown does not fit within the narrow exception
recognized by Green. In Green, the excluded statement strongly tended to show that the defendant was
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innocent. In this case, the statements were offered only for the purpose of providing additional support for Dr.
Brown's conclusion that Buchanan acted under extreme emotional stress. Even without the proffered
statements, Dr. Brown's testimony provided ample evidence to explain his opinion. For this reason, the
statements would have had only cumulative probative value. After the trial court offered to continue the case
and summon the relatives and friends whom Dr. Brown interviewed, Brown's attorney said: "I don't want to do
that Judge. We have enough. I just want to object to your not allowing it in."
The excluded statements also lack the inherent reliability of the statement excluded in Green. The statement
in Green was against the declarant's penal interest, made spontaneously to a close friend, and the state itself
had relied on the excluded testimony to convict the declarant of capital murder. At Buchanan's trial, these
compelling circumstances do not appear.
The evidence in this case discloses that the application of Virginia's hearsay rule did not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.
Finding no error, we affirm the judgment denying Buchanan's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
AFFIRMED.
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96-1469 U.S. V. RAMIREZ
Ruling below (CA 9, 91 F.3d 1297, 59 CrL 1483):
Exigency supporting no-knock entry of dwelling accomplished through
destruction of property must be stronger than "mild exigency" that suffices to
justify no-knock entry without property damage; facts that suspect being sought
at another person's home had knocked down law enforcement officer in escaping
from custody, had declared that he would not do lengthy federal sentence he was
facing, had struck officer and rammed police vehicle in another escape attempt,
and had threatened to kill witnesses did not provide sufficient exigency to justify
police officer in breaking of window and poking gun through it.
Question presented: Must police officers possess more specific evidence of
danger to themselves or others in order to justify no-knock entry in which they
damage door or window than would be required to justify no-knock entry made
without damage to property?
SUPREME COURT WELL HEAR BORING CASE
Portland Oregonian
Tuesday, June 24, 1997
Laurie Asseo The Associated Press
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to use a
case from Boring, to clarify what evidence of danger
must exist before police with search warrants can break
into a home without knocking first.
The court agreed to hear federal prosecutors' bid to
use weapons seized from a man's home in Boring as
evidence against him in a gun-possession case. The
prosecutors say the seizure was proper even though
police with a search warrant broke a window in the
house without knocking first.
Hernan Ramirez was charged in 1994 with
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
Police with a search warrant went to his home on a
tip that an escaped inmate might have been there.
Officials said the inmate had struck a guard, stole a
vehicle and threatened to kill police officers and
others.
The 45 officers arrived early in the morning and
began announcing over a loudspeaker they had a
search warrant. Without waiting for a response, one
officer broke a garage window and began waving a gun
through it.
Ramirez said he and his wife thought they were
being burglarized. He ran to a closet, got a gun and
fired it into the ceiling. Ramirez then realized that
police had broken the window, and he surrendered.
The escaped inmate was not found. But police got
a new search warrant and seized two guns; Ramirez
was charged.
A federal judge ruled that the search violated the
Constitution's Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and said the weapons could not
be used as evidence. The judge said although the
officers' knowledge of the escaped inmate's violent past
justified entering Ramirez's home without knocking,
they must do it without damaging his property. The 9th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that ruling.
The Supreme Court ruled in 1995 that no-knock
entries by police usually are unlawful but can be
allowed if the situation involves danger to the officers
or others.
In the appeal acted on Monday, Justice Department
lawyers said police do not need extra justification to
make no-knock entries involving minor property
damage. Ramirez's lawyers said police officers face
more danger if they break in without announcing
themselves.
Copyright (c) The Oregonian 1997
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UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
Hernan RAMIREZ, Defendant-Appellee.
91 F.3d 1297
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted March 4, 1996.
Decided Aug. 2, 1996.
FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge:
Hernan Ramirez was indicted for being a felon in possession of firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The
district court determined that the firearms had been discovered in connection with a violation of Ramirez's
rights under the knock-and-announce law. 18 U.S.C. § 3109. It, therefore, suppressed the evidence of the
weapons, and the United States appealed. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On November 5, 1994, Ramirez and his wife awoke out of their peaceful slumbers to a series of unusual
sounds, including the breaking of a window. Their child, too, awoke and started crying. They feared that they
were being attacked by burglars. They were not, but by the end of the day Ramirez found himself in the
custody of federal agents and charged with a crime--felon in possession of a firearm--which could lead to a
lengthy period of incarceration. How he found himself in that predicament takes some telling.
Just three days before, Alan Laurence Shelby had knocked a deputy sheriff down and escaped from custody.
He was then facing a term of federal imprisonment of 248 months and had declared that he would not do
federal time. He had tried to escape before. One time he had struck an officer, kicked out a jail door, stolen an
automobile, and rammed a police vehicle as he attempted to get away. Another time he had attempted to escape
by using a rope made from torn bedsheets. At some time in the past he had also threatened to kill witnesses,
and, it was said, he had tortured someone with a hammer.
The authorities were understandably anxious to get Shelby back, so they sent out a press release. Almost
immediately, on November 3, 1994, a reliable confidential informant contacted Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms Special Agent George H. Kim and told him that he had seen a person he believed to be Shelby at
Ramirez's home the day before. Agent Kim and the informant then drove out to the area, and from some
distance away they saw a person who was "very similar to" a photo of Shelby and noted that the man was
wearing a blue jumpsuit and was clean-cut. That was the person the confidential informant had seen there the
day before. Thereupon, a deputy marshal also went out, and from 1,000 yards away he saw a clean-cut man
wearing blue sweats come out of the house. The marshal decided that the man was the person whom Agent
Kim had seen.
In the afternoon of the next day, a warrant to arrest Shelby at Ramirez's home was obtained, and that led to
the early morning raid on November 5, which brought Ramirez, but not Shelby, into the clutches of the law.
Ramirez's fateful day unfolded in this way. In the predawn hours of November 5, Ramirez, his wife, and
their three-year-old child were asleep in their abode. The main house had three bedrooms, a living-room, an
activity room, and a kitchen which led into a small utility room, which, in turn, led into an attached garage.
The informant, who said that Shelby was at the house, also "indicated there were supposed to be several guns in
the garage." Apparently there were not, and apparently the informant had never seen them there. Nevertheless,
that is what he had said.
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At 6:15 a.m., 45 armed officers converged on the property. The group included S.W.A.T. teams of state,
county, and city officers. The officers set up a portable loud speaker system and began announcing that they
had a search warrant, but without waiting for a response they broke the window of the garage and began
waving a gun through that window, a maneuver that was not too efficacious because a curtain got in the way.
The Ramirezes had no idea that police were outside their home, but they did hear the disturbance, did hear
the breaking of glass, and thought that they were being burglarized. They feared for their safety and for the
safety of their three-year-old child. Thus, in order to frighten the intruder off, Mr. Ramirez obtained a pistol
from a utility closet and fired it toward the ceiling of the garage. The officers fired back and shouted "Police."
At that point, and only at that point, the occupants of the house realized that it was law enforcement officers
who had broken into the home. Ramirez "ran to the living- room, threw away the firearm across the floor, and
threw himself on the floor in a prone position, shaking from fright." By 6:35 a.m., he and his wife, with their
child in her arms, had walked out of the house and into police custody. These householders were the only
persons captured in the raid. Shelby was nowhere to be found, although Ramirez acknowledged that a photo of
Shelby looked like a person who might have been there on November 3.
Based on what occurred at the house that morning, a second warrant was obtained, the gun which Ramirez
had fired and another one were seized, and Ramirez found himself in the toils of the law.
DISCUSSION
A. Knock and Announce. We have previously had occasion to expatiate on the important role that the
Fourth Amendment plays in the protection of our homes-- the centers of our family life and our refuge from the
rude world. We must now cover that ground again.
As we said in Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates:
Nowhere is the protective force of the fourth amendment more powerful than it is when the sanctity of the
home is involved. The sanctity of a person's home, perhaps our last real retreat in this technological age, lies at
the very core of the rights which animate the amendment. Therefore, we have been adamant in our demand
that absent exigent circumstances a warrant will be required before a person's home is invaded by the
authorities.
The amendment's force, however, extends even beyond the obtaining of a warrant. Even if a warrant issues,
the concerns which lie at the heart of the amendment continue to evoke our solicitude. Our "concern for the
privacy, the safety, and the property of our citizens continues...." That concern is reflected in
knock-and-announce requirements. As the Supreme Court recently said, "[iun evaluating the scope of [our
Fourth Amendment] right, we have looked to the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the framing." Among those traditions was "[tihe common
law knock-and-announce principle [which] was woven quickly into the fabric of early American law." The
Court, therefore, concluded that as a matter of constitutional law "the method of an officer's entry into a
dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure." For
our purposes, the tradition finds an even more direct expression of societal concern. "It finds expression in the
knock and announce statute which allows an officer to 'break open any outer or inner door of a house ... to
execute a search warrant if, after notice of his authority and purpose,' he is refused admittance. 18 U.S.C. §
3109." We insist upon this notice because, as individuals, we fear for our privacy in the face of government
might, and we fear for our property and our safety as well.
"The fear of a smashing in of doors by government agents is based upon much more than a concern that our
privacy will be disturbed. It is based upon concern for our safety and the safety of our families. Indeed, the
minions of dictators do not kick in doors for the mere purpose of satisfying some voyeuristic desire to peer
around and then go about their business. Something much more malevolent and dangerous is afoot when they
take those actions. It is that which strikes terror into the hearts of their victims. The fourth amendment
protects us from that fear as much as it protects our privacy...."
As concerned citizens we also fear the needless injuries that might be inflicted upon police officers, or upon a
homeowner, as a result of the homeowner's mistaken belief that miscreants are invading his little castle. So it
was here. Had Ramirez been less reasonable, the officer at the window might have been killed; had Ramirez
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been less wise, he or his family might have been killed. As it was, his property was needlessly damaged when
his home was broken into.
When the officers executed the warrant they brushed aside the wisdom of history and elicited a response
which, if not strictly intended, should have been reasonably foreseen. They seek to excuse their conduct on the
grounds that the dangerousness of Shelby resulted in an exigency which permitted them to break into the home
of Ramirez without following knock-and-announce requirements.
No doubt exigent circumstances can justify breaking into a house without notice, but "incantation of that
phrase does not dissolve the shield that our law provides." When exigency is claimed, we must determine what
kind of exigency it was. "We have held that even a mild exigency, like knowledge that a person is dangerous,
can justify immediate entry where that can be done without any physical disruption of property. That, of course,
is not this case." Here, an officer broke into the home through a window, poked a gun through the window,
and was ready to fire the weapon if he deemed it necessary to do so. It takes more than a mild exigency to
justify that. "To justify physical destruction of property '[miore specific inferences of exigency are necessary.'
Was there more? We think not.
Consider. The 45 officers did not fear any of the actual residents of the house and were not attacking a gang
or cult hangout where they might be met by a fusillade of gunfire. They were concerned about one person,
Shelby, who might be on the premises. But Shelby was not known to have ever shot or shot at anyone. He was
an escape artist, who said he would not go to federal prison. He had knocked people down in his escape
attempts, and he had stolen a car and run into a police vehicle. His violence towards law enforcement had not
extended beyond that, even though he had obviously been arrested on some occasions. Perhaps his degree of
dangerousness bespoke a mild exigency. Certainly it did not bespeak more.
On the other hand, in a case where a person in a drug dealer's apartment was known to own a gun, but there
was no indication that he had the gun with him, we found no exigent circumstances at all. And in United
States v. Mendonsa we found the circumstances insufficient to justify breaking into a house after the police
heard a little noise, even though an occupant was a drug dealer who had a prior felony conviction for armed
robbery. We also found no exigency where all the police had was a generalized concern about drug dealers.
The same sort of generalized unspecific concerns proved insufficient in Becker.
We did find a mild exigency in United States v. Von Willie where the police sought to execute a search
warrant at the home of an armed warlord for a motorcycle gang. In that case, the police did attempt to comply
with § 3109 at one door, did comply with it at another door, but seized Von Willie at still a third door without
compliance after he had seen them and was trying to shut them out. Under the combination of what was known
before plus what happened on the scene, we validated an entry which took place with no destruction of
property. Similarly, in United States v. Scott we found a mild exigency. The police arrived on the scene to
execute a warrant. Scott opened the blinds and saw them; he had a weapon in his hand. He then attempted to
close an open door, as the police announced their presence and that they had a warrant. They then forced their
way into the room. We were satisfied that there was a mild exigency, and we excused any failure to comply
with the knock-and-announce rule. None of those circumstances inform the case at hand. There is no
suggestion that the police presence was known, no confirmation that Shelby was on the premises, and, more
importantly, no indication that Shelby was armed and would resist with deadly force.
We were considerably more impressed when the police knew that the person they were after had a gun and
had heard him say that he kept the gun to use against the police themselves. We were equally impressed in
United States v. Perez and for much the same reasons. There the police on the scene realized that Perez
probably knew they were present. Moreover, he was probably armed, had killed before, and had said that if
arrested "he intended to 'go down shooting.' " In both cases we did find more than a mild exigency. Of course,
the police had no such information about Shelby. They neither knew that he had a gun, nor that he had access
to one, nor that he would consider using one against them.
We have touched upon all of these cases because our review is necessarily fact-bound. Our cases do not
describe a simple straight line, rather they graph a much more complex curve. Police must have some leeway
in balancing the demands of the knock-and-announce requirement against other safety considerations.
Nevertheless, the courts must ultimately determine whether the police struck that balance properly. We think it
clear that the police did not do so in this case.
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Again, the householders themselves presented no known danger. If he was there, Shelby might wish to
escape, but the phalanx of already positioned officers on hand made escape unlikely. Moreover, there was no
specific evidence that Shelby was armed, that he would use firearms against the officers, or that when he was
faced with that show of force he would do anything violent at all. Also, before the break-in nothing developed
on the scene which would have added to the circumstances already known and, thus, raise them to a higher
degree of exigency. In short, we agree with the district court that the knock-and-announce rules were violated
in this case.
CONCLUSION
The flame of our Fourth Amendment liberties is bright and strong--that should come as no surprise. It has
been tended by lovers of liberty for over two centuries. While it bums, it keeps our homes free from unlawful
intrusions by the government. Still, it is just a flame, and it will be quickly quenched if it is not protected.
Should that occur, a tenebrific atmosphere would envelop our liberties and our homes. That must not happen.
We hold that Ramirez's statutory and Fourth Amendment rights were violated when government agents
broke into his home in the early morning hours without complying with the knock-and-announce requirements.
We also hold that the district court correctly suppressed use of the seized weapons as evidence against him.
AFFIRMED.
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96-8653 GRAY V. MARYLAND
Ruling below (Md CtApp, 344 Md. 417, 687 A.2d 660, 60 CrL 1
395):
Introduction, at joint trial of defendant and non-testifying co-def
endant, of co-defendant's confession that implicates defendant does
not violate Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, as interpreted
in Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968), if defendant's name is
replaced by word "deleted," jury is instructed to consider statement
only against co-defendant, and confession does not compel jury to
link defendant to confession; redacted confession in this case did
not compel jury to link it to defendant, given jury's knowledge that
as many as six persons participated in crime for which defendant
and co-defendant were tried.
Question presented: Did introduction of redacted statement of n
on-testifying co-defendant deprive defendant of his Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation?
CALIFORNIA HIGH COURT ADOPTS CASE-BY-CASE TEST FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF CO-
DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION THAT REFERS TO DEFENDANT BY NEUTRAL TERMS
West's Legal News
July 1, 1996
Stephanie Stone
Addressing an issue that has split both state and
federal courts, the California Supreme Court
unanimously held June 20 that editing a
co-defendant's out-of-court confession to substitute
pronouns or other neutral terms for the defendant's
name will not necessarily be enough to avoid
violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to confrontation.
Rather, the sufficiency of the editing must be
determined on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether the average juror, viewing the confession in
light of the other evidence introduced at trial, could
not avoid drawing the inference that the defendant is
the person so designated.
The issue in the case, People v. Fletcher, has
come up in many jurisdictions in light of two
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court: Bruton v. U.S.
(1968) and Richardson v. Marsh (1987).
In Bruton, the Court held that a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights are violated by the admission of a
nontestifying co-defendant's confession implicating
the defendant, even when the jury is instructed to
disregard the confession in determining the
defendant's guilt. In Richardson, however, the Court
limited that doctrine by holding that no violation
occurs if the confession is redacted to omit any
reference to the defendant and a proper limiting
instruction is given. The situation at bar -- in which
the defendant's name has been replaced with a
symbol or neutral pronoun -- was explicitly left open.
Since Richardson, courts have adopted different
tests to decide the admissibility of a co-defendant's
confession in such situations. Many federal courts
and the state of Maine have applied a rule of
admissibility per se, admitting into evidence any
redacted confession that, on its face, does not
incriminate the defendant. Meanwhile, several other
states, including Iowa, Maryland, New York and
Hawaii, have chosen a case-by-case approach to
determine whether the edited confession presents a
substantial risk that the jury would consider it in
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deciding a defendant's guilt.
In Fletcher, the California Supreme Court
reasoned that while the substitution of a pronoun for
the defendant's name will make a confession less
directly incriminating, "it will not invariably provide
sufficient assurance that the average reasonable juror
will be able to obey an instruction to disregard the
confession when considering the guilt of the
nondeclarant.
"A confession redacted with neutral pronouns
may still prove impossible to 'thrust out of mind' if,
for example, it contains references to distinctive
clothing, mannerisms, place of residence, or other
information that readily and unmistakably identifies
the person referred to as the nondeclarant
defendant," Associate Justice Joyce L. Kennard
wrote for the Court.
"[W]here any reasonable juror must inevitably
perceive that the defendant on trial is the person
designated by pronoun or neutral term in the
codefendant's confession, an assumption that a
limiting instruction could 'be successful in
dissuading the jury from entering onto the path of
inference' would be little short of absurd."
However, a redacted confession may be sufficient
if the co-defendant was just one of a large group of
individuals, any one of whom could have been the
co- participant mentioned in the confession, the
Court noted.
Here, the admission of a co-defendant's murder
and attempted robbery confession, edited to
substitute the words "a friend" for the defendant's
name, violated the defendant's rights because the
confession was strongly incriminating, and
reasonable jurors could not avoid inferring that the
"friend" was the defendant due to other testimony,
the Court wrote.
CASE HISTORY
--People v. Fletcher, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 177
(Cal.App. 4 Dist. Nov. 30, 1994), review granted
and opinion superseded, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 823 (Cal.
March 2, 1995), review dismissed, cause remanded,
52 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 (Cal. May 1, 1996) (Trial court
erred in allowing use of co-defendant's confession
which clearly implied that two people were involved
in crime against defendant notwithstanding fact that
defendant was not specifically named in confession;
error in allowing use of confession was prejudicial
and required reversal of defendant's convictions.) 36
Cal.Rptr.2d 177
CITED CASES
--Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S.Ct. 1702
(U.S.Mich. April 21, 1987) (Admission of
nontestifying co-defendant's confession did not
violate felony- murder defendant's right under
confrontation clause where court instructed jury not
to use confession in any way against defendant, and
confession was redacted to eliminate not only
defendant's name, but any reference to her
existence.) 107 S.Ct. 1702
--Bruton v. United States, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (U.S.Mo.
May 20, 1968) (Admission of co-defendant's
confession that implicated defendant at joint trial
constituted prejudicial error even though trial court
gave clear, concise and understandable instruction
that confession could only be used against co-
defendant and must be disregarded with respect to
defendant.) 88 S.Ct. 1620
Copyright 1996
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SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE CONFESSION ISSUE
The Baltimore Sun
Tuesday, June 17, 1997
Lyle Denniston
WASHINGTON -- The Supreme Court, taking on a Baltimore case, agreed yesterday to
consider limiting prosecutors' use of a criminal confession by a suspect who is being tried with
other individuals.
At such joint trials, there is a risk that juries will interpret a confession by one of the accused
as applying to other suspects, too. The court will consider how to reduce that risk. Lower federal
and state courts are divided on how to handle such confessions, leading the justices to step in to
resolve the conflict.
The issue was raised in an appeal by Kevin Domonic Gray, a Baltimore youth who was
convicted of manslaughter and given a seven-year prison term for his role in the fatal beating of
another youth, Stacey Williams, in 1993.
Up to six people took part in the beating on Wildwood Parkway in a dispute over money that
Williams was thought to owe one of his attackers. Williams was held aloft and then thrown down
and kicked repeatedly. He died a few hours later.
Two of the attackers, Gray and Anthony Bell, were tried jointly for their part in the assault.
Bell confessed to police, saying that he, Gray and a third youth had been involved. Soon after the
beating, the third youth was shot to death in an unrelated incident.
Bell's confession was used at the trial, with the names of the two others he had mentioned
edited out. Because Bell did not testify at the trial, he could not be questioned about his statement.
Gray's lawyers have contended that Bell's confession seemed to point to Gray, too, but that
Bell could not be cross-examined. As a result, Gray's lawyers contended, Gray's constitutional
right to confront his accuser at a trial had been violated.
The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld Grays conviction in January, noting that the trial judge
had told the jurors to consider Bell's confession only against Bell. The edited confession was used
properly at the trial, the state court said, because the statement did not coerce jurors into reading
it as implicating Gray.
A Supreme Court ruling is expected next year.
Copyright 1997 @ The Baltimore Sun Company
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STATE of Maryland
V.
Kevin D. GRAY.
No. 15, Sept. Term, 1996.
687 A.2d 660
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Jan. 15, 1997.
KARWACKI, Judge.
The issue presented in this case is whether the introduction of a nontestifying co-defendant's confession
implicating a defendant and others, which is redacted to exclude the names of all those involved in the crime, other
than the confessor, by using the words "deleted" and "deletion," violates a defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, even if the jury is instructed to
consider the confession only against the codefendant-confessor? We shall hold that under the circumstances in this
case it does not and reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
I.
Stacey Williams was beaten on November 10, 1993, by a group of six young men. Within a few hours, Williams
died from his injuries. Following a preliminary investigation, the police arrested Anthony Bell. In a written
statement to police, Bell implicated himself, Jacquin Vanlandingham, and Kevin Domonic Gray, the Petitioner,
as participants in the beating. Vanlandingham was fatally shot two days after Williams' death, and Gray was
arrested one day later. These three individuals were the only ones identified by name in Bell's statement to police
as those involved in the murder, although evidence adduced at trial suggested that as many as six persons
participated in the attack on Williams.
Bell and Gray were scheduled to be tried jointly in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Prior to trial, however,
Gray moved to sever his trial from Bell's, or alternatively to exclude his confession from evidence. The trial court
denied both motions but ordered the redaction of Gray and Vanlandingham's names from Bell's confession.
At trial, the State presented the testimony of Tracy Brumfield, Shay Yarberough, and Baltimore City Homicide
Detective Homer Pennington. Brumfield testified that she saw Gray, Vanlandingham, and several others chase
Williams down the street. Yarberough, the only witness to Williams' beating, testified that he saw Vanlandingham
lift Williams over his head and drop him on the sidewalk. Yarberough also testified that Gray attempted the same
maneuver, albeit less successfully, and, along with the other five members of the group, including Bell, repeatedly
kicked Williams about the ribs, neck, and head.
Detective Pennington testified that his investigation led him to arrest and interview Bell. In the course of that
interview, Bell formally confessed to participating in the beating of Williams, implicating both Gray and
Vanlandingham in the process.
The State was permitted to read Bell's confession into evidence over his objection, but, as indicated, supra, was
concomitantly required to redact the names of Gray and Vanlandingham, and insert in their place, the words
"deletion" or "deleted." A copy of the redacted confession was admitted into evidence with blank white spaces
indicating where the names of Gray and Vanlandingham had been.
Unlike Bell, Gray testified in his own defense, claiming that he was speaking with his girlfriend on a public
telephone when the fray ensued. Chanel Brown, Gray's girlfriend, testified that he had called her from a telephone
booth and, during that conversation, said that Vanlandingham was fighting. Defense witness Lamont Mathews
testified that although he had witnessed Williams' beating, he placed Gray at a telephone booth "up the street"
during the melee. The jury nonetheless convicted Gray of involuntary manslaughter, for which he was sentenced
to ten years imprisonment with all but seven years suspended.
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Gray appealed that judgment to the Court of Special Appeals, claiming that the introduction of Bell's redacted
confession violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and was contrary to the holding in Bruton v.
United States. The intermediate appellate court agreed and reversed Gray's conviction. We granted the State's
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
II.
In the trial of every criminal case, state or federal, a defendant has the right "to be confronted with witnesses
against him." Implicit in this principle is the right to cross-examine those witnesses.
In Bruton v. United States, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that the admission of a nontestifying
codefendant's pretrial confession implicating another codefendant by name, violated that defendant's Sixth
Amendment confrontation right, notwithstanding an instruction to the jury to disregard the confession in
determining the nonconfessing defendant's guilt. Bruton was tried and convicted along with one Evans, who,
during the preceding investigation, orally confessed to a postal inspector that he and Bruton perpetrated an armed
postal robbery. The postal inspector subsequently testified to Evans' confession. The trial judge duly instructed
the jury that the confession was competent evidence against Evans only and was not to be used in assessing Bruton's
innocence or guilt. The Supreme Court nevertheless reversed Bruton's conviction.
In so doing, the Court repudiated its previous position that " 'it is reasonably possible for the jury to follow'
sufficiently clear instructions to disregard the confessor's extrajudicial statement that his codefendant participated
with him committing the crime." The reason for the departure, articulated initially by the Delli Paoli dissent, was
that:
"too often such admonition against misuse [of a codefendant's confession] is intrinsically ineffective in that the
effect of such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors. The admonition therefore
becomes a futile collection of words and fails of its purpose as a legal protection to defendants.... The Government
should not have the windfall of the jury being influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter of law,
they should not consider but which they cannot put out of their minds."
The Court acknowledged three arguments supporting the use of limiting instructions in this area, namely the
probative value of the confession, judicial economy, and the integrity of the jury system itself, but categorically
rejected the first two. While the confession may be the best evidence of the confessor's guilt, alternative ways exist
to allow the State the benefit of the confession without infringing upon the nonconfessing defendant's constitutional
rights. The use of redactions is but one example.
Similarly, joint trials conserve state resources by avoiding the necessity of duplicate proceedings, reduce
inconveniences to witnesses, and accelerate the judicial process. Nevertheless, fundamental constitutional rights,
such as the right of confrontation, are seldom sacrificed upon the altar of judicial efficiency.
Turning to the third argument in support of limiting instructions, the Court acknowledged that inadmissible
evidence inevitably finds its way before the jury, but that reliance on the jury's ability to perform its role is justified
under many circumstances. In those instances, "[iut is not unreasonable to conclude ... [that] the jury can and will
follow the trial judge's instructions to disregard such information." When, however,
"the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant who stands side-by-side with the
defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial ... the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure [are] so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human
limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored."
The Court concluded that:
"despite the concededly clear instructions to the jury to disregard Evans' inadmissible hearsay evidence
inculpating [Bruton], in the context of ajoint trial, we cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute
for [Bruton's] constitutional right of cross examination.... The effect is the same as if there had been no instruction
at all."
II.
Nineteen years later in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987), the practice
of omitting any references to a defendant from a statement being introduced against a confessing co-defendant was
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challenged--a practice initially suggested by the Court itself. Clariss Marsh, Benjamin Williams and Kareem
Martin were charged with assaulting Cynthia Knighton and murdering her son, Koran, and her aunt, Ollie Scott.
Over Marsh's objection, Marsh and Williams were tried together. At trial, the state introduced a confession made
by Williams shortly after his arrest. The confession had been redacted to omit all references to Marsh. In fact, on
its face, the confession implicated no one other than Williams and Martin in the crimes. Williams did not testify.
Nevertheless, Marsh was linked to the confession via her own testimony that she was in the vehicle on the way to
the crime scene when, by Williams' admission, he and Martin discussed their plans to rob and kill the victims,
although Marsh claims not to have heard the conversation. Marsh also testified to being in the house during the
robbery, but could not explain why she did not attempt to flee or otherwise assist the victims.
During his closing remarks, the prosecutor cautioned the jury not to use Williams' confession as evidence against
Marsh. Nevertheless, he linked Marsh to the confession by suggesting that if Marsh was in the car during Martin
and Williams' conversation, she was, by implication, part of the criminal enterprise. Marsh was convicted of two
counts of felony murder and one count of assault with intent to commit murder.
Marsh successfully appealed her conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In
reversing her conviction, that court opined:
"Sanctioning the admission of an extrajudicial statement in circumstances in which a substantial risk exists that
the statement will be used against the defendant not only denies the Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation, but
raises serious due process concerns regarding the validity of the conviction and the fundamental fairness of the trial
process. It is no answer to this unfairness to say that the evidence that set the stage was subject to cross-
examination.... [The determination of whether there exists a substantial risk that the jury might have [improperly]
considered [the confession] 'may require consideration of other evidence.' "
Assuming the existence of such a risk, the Sixth Circuit noted that the only direct evidence suggesting Marsh
knew beforehand that the victims would be robbed and executed was Williams' account of his conversation with
Martin just prior to the crime. In view of the lack of other evidence connecting Marsh to the activities of Williams
and Martin, the prosecutor's linkage of Marsh to the confession proved "powerfully incriminating" to her with
respect to the critical element of intent, thereby violating her Sixth Amendment confrontation right. Noting that
other courts of appeals have declined to adopt the "evidentiary linkage" or "contextual implication" approach to
the Bruton problem, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
The Supreme Court in Marsh rejected the Sixth Circuit's analysis and characterized the holding in Bruton as "a
narrow exception" to the general principle that jurors follow instructions given them. The Court premised its
holding upon three basic assumptions. First, "where the necessity of ... linkage [to other evidence] is involved, it
is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the evidence." Unlike
specific testimony directly inculpating the defendant, as was the case in Bruton, inferential incrimination can be
avoided by dissuading the jury from making the inference in the first instance.
Second, the practical effect of the "linkage" or "contextual approach" to the Bruton question would place an
impossible burden upon trial courts. If limited to facially incriminating confessions, Bruton compliance could be
had by simple redaction. Conversely, an analysis requiring linkage requires both a pretrial and post-trial
determination of whether, after viewing all the evidence introduced, the confession is so "powerfully incriminating"
that it should either be excluded in the first instance or the defendant granted a new trial. Such a result not only
invites defense malfeasance, but consumes large quantities of time and guarantees nothing in the way of certainty.
Finally, although it might be suggested that the simple remedy to the Bruton problem is to forego joint trials
when the confession of one defendant might conceivably incriminate the other, the efficacy of that remedy is
questionable. Not only do joint trials serve an important function in our criminal justice system in terms of
efficiency, they protect defendants from the unfair advantage that a later tried defendant has over his earlier-tried
counterpart, and avoid the criticism associated with inconsistent verdicts.
In the end, the Court declined to extend Bruton's reach, concluding that "the calculus changes when confessions
that do not name the defendant are at issue." Having said that, however, the Court specifically reserved the issue
of "the admissibility of a confession in which the defendant's name has been replaced with a symbol or neutral
pronoun." This, of course, is the issue presently before us.
IV.
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There exits a substantial split of authority on the proper approach to the question expressly left open in Marsh.
Some courts subscribe to the "contextual" or "evidentiary linkage" approach to the Bruton problem. Those
jurisdictions principally rely upon the notion that when a nontestifying codefendant's confession tends to inculpate
a defendant in light of other evidence presented, or to be presented, at trial, thereby creating a "substantial risk"
that the jury will improperly use the confession, the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right is denied.
Other jurisdictions, however, employ the "facial implication" doctrine, holding that when the complaining
defendant's name is replaced with a neutral pronoun, and the confession does not otherwise, by itself, inculpate that
defendant, it is admissible against the confessing codefendant.
At their extremes, neither approach is completely satisfactory. Evidentiary linkage, applied in its most liberal
form, completely undermines the long held, and vitally necessary presumption that juries follow trial court
instructions. The approach also has practical administrative difficulties and may harm defendants as much as it
may protect them.
Similarly, while the facial implication doctrine has simplistic appeal, redacted confessions with "neutral
pronouns may still prove impossible to 'thrust out of mind.' " The possibility certainly exists whereby
notwithstanding the substitution of a defendant's name with a neutral pronoun, a jury could reach but one
conclusion-that the omission is, in fact, the nonconfessing codefendant. Although one might argue that is so only
when linked with other evidence admitted at trial, the inferential step that the jury must take to reach that
conclusion may be so small as to be no step at all. In those instances, the act of redaction becomes a mere
formalistic exercise devoid of the Constitutional protections undergirding Bruton, and the confession's exclusion
from evidence is warranted.
Despite the State's assertions to the contrary, it does not necessarily follow from Bruton or Marsh that a
confession that does not implicate a nonconfessing codefendant by name, automatically, and without further
inquiry, passes Constitutional muster. We reject, in its most pristine form, the facial implication doctrine urged
by the State.
We think the better approach is that typified by the holding in United States v. Pendegraph, where the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that "a redacted confession may still violate the
Bruton rule if the statement compels a directly inculpating inference" between the redacted confession and the
nonconfessing codefendant.
As we see it, this approach accords with the rationale of Bruton as explained and limited by Marsh. The
substantial risk to which Bruton speaks comes not from the incriminatory tendency of a nontestifying codefendant's
confession as to another defendant, but from the belief that in certain exceptional circumstances, a jury will not be
able to resist the temptation to ignore the trial court's instructions to overlook what has been thrust into their line
of sight Indeed, jurors are strongly presumed to follow trial court instructions. When however, the directly (and
undeniably) inculpatory statements of a codefendant are given to the jury's consideration, notwithstanding a
limiting instruction to the contrary, the presumption is overcome and a substantial risk therefore exists that the jury
will use the confession as evidence against the nonconfessing defendant. In other words, a Bruton violation occurs
when jurors are compelled to do, as rational human beings, that which they have been instructed by the trial court
they must not--link a nonconfessing defendant to a nontestifying codefendant's confession. The compulsion to
make the impermissible inference must be compelling, inevitable, and subject to little or no debate. Otherwise, the
general and strong presumption that jurors follow their instructions is not overcome, and the requirements of
Bruton are therefore satisfied.
To be sure, some courts have predicated their conclusions that a confession creates a "substantial risk" that the
jury will not heed trial court instructions and therefore is "powerfully incriminating" to a defendant based upon the
relative strength of the state's case. That analysis, however, concerns whether the denial of a defendant's
confrontation rights was harmless, not whether the denial of those rights occurred in the first place. We agree that
"[t]he decision on how to 'Brutonize' a statement, if necessary, must ordinarily be made early in the trial, when
the judge is not in an ideal position to assess the strength of the government's case. A judge can decide at the
outset, however, whether a codefendant statement is likely to incriminate other defendants in such a way as to
create a substantial risk that the jury will consider it in deciding on the guilt of those defendants. If the
incriminating references ultimately adds little to the government's case, then their exclusion does no harm, and the
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confrontation rights of the defendants are preserved. We do not read Bruton as guaranteeing a right of
confrontation only as against testimony that proves to be vital to the prosecution's case."
It was in this manner that the trial judge in the case sub judice ordered the redaction of Bell's confession, but
otherwise allowed the State the benefit of its evidentiary value.
V.
As indicated in Part I., supra, the State substituted the words "deletion" or "deleted", for the names of Gray and
Vanlandingham. Bell's redacted confession, read to the jury and introduced into evidence, provided in pertinent
part:
"Question, what can you tell me about the beating of Stacey Williams that occurred on 10, November, 1993?
Answer, an argument broke out between deletion and Stacey in the 500 block of Louden Avenue. Stacey got
smacked and then ran into Wildwood Parkway. Me, deleted, and a few other guys ran after Stacey. We caught up
to him on Wildwood Parkway. We beat Stacey up. After we beat Stacey up, we walked him back to Louden
Avenue. I then walked over and used the phone, Stacey and the others walked down Louden.
Question, when Stacey was beaten on Wildwood Parkway, how was he beaten?
Answer, hit, kicked.
Question, who hit and kicked Stacey?
Answer, I hit Stacey. He was kicked, but I don't know who kicked him.
Question, who was in the group that beat Stacey?
Answer, me, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys.
Question, did anyone pick Stacey up and drop him to the ground?
Answer, no, when I was there.
Question, what was the argument over between Stacey and deleted?
Answer, some money that Stacey owed deleted.
Question, how many guys were hitting on Stacey?
Answer, about six guys.
Question, do you have a black jacket with Park Heights written on the back?
Answer, yes.
Question, who else has these jackets?
Answer, deletion."
Prior to the confession's introduction into evidence, the court cautioned the jury that
"the statement provided by Mr. Bell is to be considered by you as evidence against Mr. Bell only and in no way
is Mr. Bell's statement provided to the detective about which he's about to testify to be considered as evidence
against Mr. Gray. It is evidence against Mr. Bell only, and, as I will instruct you later, you will consider the
evidence against the defendants individually and reach a separate verdict as to each defendant."
Taking its cue from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the intermediate appellate court relied heavily
upon Smith v. United States, wherein blank spaces were used in place of Smith's name in his co-defendant's
inculpatory, but otherwise redacted, confession. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia opined that:
"In order to determine whether a substantial risk exists [that the jury will improperly use the confession against
the non-confessing codefendant], 'the trial court must consider the degree of inference the jury must make to
connect the defendant to the statement and the degree of risk that the jury will make that linkage despite a limiting
instruction.' The trial court's assessment as to whether the redaction effectively avoids linkage with the defendant
must be make in the context of other evidence admitted at trial."
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Applying that standard, the Court of Special Appeals noted that "mere deletion of [Gray and Vanlandingham's
names]" failed to eliminate from Bell's confession Bruton hazards because the jury "did not have to make a
substantial inference that [Gray] was [one of] the person[s] neutrally referenced in the redacted statement." Gray.
In other words, in light of other evidence presented at Gray's trial, "the jury could reasonably infer that it was
appellant whose name had been 'deleted.' "
While we agree that the jury could have reasonably inferred that one of the deleted names belonged to Gray, that
inference was not compelled. As both the trial court and the intermediate appellate court acknowledged, as many
as six individuals participated in the attack on Williams. The Court of Special Appeals, however, pointed out that
Honly three were positively identified--Bell, appellant, and [Vanlandingham]" and concluded that "[Grayl's role
was clearly demonstrated by Bell's confession, rendering it facially incriminating[.]" We disagree.
As we have said, a Bruton violation occurs when a codefendant's confession, either facially, or by compelling
and inevitable inference, inculpates a nonconfessing defendant. Under those circumstances, there is a substantial
risk that the jury will not heed the trial court's instructions to disregard the confession as evidence against the
nonconfessing defendant or defendants.
True, Shay Yarberough implicated the same individuals from the witness stand as did Bell's confession, but
Yarberough also testified that at least three other individuals were involved in the fray, whom he could not (or
would not) identify. Other than by inference, the jury had no way of knowing that Yarberough's testimony and
Bell's confession paralleled, and the prosecution did not, in any way, suggest such a coincidence. It was that very
inference that the trial court instructed the jury that they must not make.
As we indicated, supra, that the jury could have reasonably connected Gray to Bell's confession is not sufficient
to raise a Bruton challenge. Although the jury knew at the time of trial Vanlandingham was dead, the omitted
references in Bell's confession could have been any one of at least four other individuals--a fact emphasized by the
States' Attorney no less than three times during her final summation. The jury was instructed not to use Bell's
confession as evidence against Gray, and, in light of the strong presumption that the jury followed those
instructions, Gray's Sixth Amendment confrontation right was adequately protected. His unsupported speculation
about what the jury might have done if they drew an impermissible inference is simply insufficient to warrant a
reversal upon these facts. In short, "there does not exist [in the present case] the overwhelming probability of [the
jury's inability to follow trial court instructions] that is the foundation of the Bruton [ I ... Rule."
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY.
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96-7185 BATES V. U.S.
Ruling below (CA 7, 96 F.3d 964, 60 CrL 2022):
Federal statute prohibiting knowing and willful misapplication of federally
guaranteed student aid funds, 20 USC 1097 (a), does not require that government
allege and prove that defendant specifically intended to injure or defraud United
States, but, instead, requires government to allege and prove only that defendant
consciously, voluntarily, and intentionally exercised unauthorized control or
dominion over covered funds for use and benefit of defendant or third party, while
knowing that such exercise of control or dominion violated law.
Question presented: Must government prove fraudulent intent on part of
defendant as essential element of crime, proscribed by 20 USC 1097 (a), of
knowingly and willfully misapplying federally insured funds?
96-738 SALINAS V. U.S.
Ruling below (U.S. v. Marmolejo, CA 5, 86 F.3d 404, 59 CrL 1321):
18 USC 666(a)(1) (B), which prohibits officials of state and local agencies that
receive "in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under any federal
program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance or other
form of Federal assistance, "from soliciting or accepting anything of value from
any person in exchange for being influenced "in connection with any business,
transaction, or series of such transactions of such government.. .involving anything
of value of $5,000 or more, "applies to actions by county sheriff and deputy of
accepting payments of more than $5,000 for arranging unauthorized conjugal
visits for federal prisoner housed in local jail pursuant to agreements by which jail
received federal construction funds in excess of $10,000 in return for housing
federal prisoners; in order to be guilty of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act conspiracy, defendant must simply agree to objective of
violation of RICO and need not agree to personally violate statute.
Questions presented: (1) What kind of cases involving state employees are
subject to prosecution under Section 666, and do they include those in which no
federal funds are disbursed or impinged? (2) Before defendant can be found guilty
of conspiracy provisions of federal racketeering statute, must government prove
that he personally committed or agreed to commit two RICO predicate acts?
96-1579 BROGAN V. U.S.
Ruling below (U.S. v. Wiener, CA 2, 96 F.3d 35, 65 LW 2255, 60 CrL 1013):
"Exculpatory no" doctrine, under which false statement amounting to
exculpatory denial of criminal activity is deemed outside reach of statute that
prohibits making of false statements within jurisdiction of federal agency, 18 USC
1001, is rejected as defense to Section 1001 prosecution.
Question presented: Should "exculpatory no" doctrine, recognized by courts
of appeals for seven circuits as complete defense to false statement charge under
18 USC 1001, but rejected below by Second Circuit, be embraced by this court?
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96-1769 OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY V. WOODARD
Ruling below (CA 6, 107 F.3d 1178, 60 CrL 1540):
Under analysis of Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), role of clemency
proceedings in Ohio's overall capital adjudicatory scheme requires that state death
row prisoner be given some minimal procedural due process in clemency
proceedings, on remand, district court must determine whether state's optional
clemency interview process, which forces condemned prisoner to choose between
remaining silent and participating in process, implicates Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
Questions presented: (1) May state clemency procedures be reviewed under due
process limitations on state's overall scheme of adjudication of crimes and
punishment established by Evitts v. Lucey, or does Connecticut Board of Pardons
v. Durnschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981), contain sole due process limitations on those
procedures? (2) Do inmate interviews, held voluntarily at request of inmate as part
of state clemency procedure, impose unconstitutional condition on inmate's Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination?
96-976 HUDSON V. U.S.
Ruling below (CA 10, 92 F.2d 1026):
Under objective test set out in U.S. v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), there was
no "gross disproportionality" between civil monetary sanctions of $44,000
imposed by Comptroller of Currency upon defendants for banking violations and
proven damages to government of $72,000, and, therefore, district court erred in
determining that monetary sanctions were not solely remedial and that subsequent
criminal indictment of defendants violated Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
Clause.
Questions presented: (1) Does imposition upon defendants of monetary fines
as in personam civil penalties by Department of Treasury, together with sanctions,
constitute "punishment" for purposes of Double Jeopardy Clause? (2) Can such
fines be justified by reference to "costs of investigation" allegedly incurred by
regulatory agency that assessed them when: (a)statute pursuant to which sanctions
were assessed contains specific criteria for imposing fines and does not authorize
consideration of "investigatory costs," (b) no agency of government contends it
was victim of conduct for which fines were imposed, and (c) "costs of
investigation" were not considered by agency assessing fines in review of
judgment below to resolve express conflict between opinion of Tenth Circuit in
this case and opinion of Seventh Circuit in S.A. Healy Co. V. Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission, 96 F.3d 906, 909-10, 65 LW 2205, 60 CrL 1050
(CA 7 1996), with regard to questions presented?
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96-7901 TREST V. CAIN
Ruling below (Trest v. Whitley, CA 5, 94 F.3d 1005):
Habeas corpus petitioner who alleges that Louisiana state court erred in
relying on prior Mississippi convictions that were allegedly unconstitutional to
declare him habitual offender is barred from raising challenge to predicate
Mississippi convictions that would have been time-barred in Mississippi.
Question presented: Despite state's failure to raise affirmative defense of
procedural default at any stage in federal habeas corpus proceedings, is court of
appeals required to raise defense sua sponte, and is court of appeals foreclosed
from reviewing claim on merits on basis of its conclusion that claim is
procedurally defaulted?
- 96-7151 LEWIS V. U.S.
Ruling below (CA 5, 92 F.3d 1371):
Although federal indictment that charged defendant with first degree murder
under Louisiana law through federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 USC 13, is
defective, conviction is nevertheless affirmed on basis of federal second degree
murder statute, 18 USC 1111, whose basic elements are same as those of
improperly assimilated state law on first degree murder; defendant's sentence did
not exceed maximum sentence permitted under federal second degree murder
statute, and thus remand for resentencing is not warranted.
Questions presented: (1) Can court of appeals enter judgment of conviction
under "analogous" federal statute in lieu of conviction under improperly
assimilated state statute at trial, when doing so is not harmless error and causes
substantial prejudice to defendant's rights? (2) Can court of appeals refuse to
apply mandatory Sentencing Guidelines to defendant's conviction on analogous
federal second degree murder statute and impose sentence on defendant that
exceeds maximum Sentencing Guideline range?
96-1487 U.S. V. BAJAKAJIAN
Ruling below (CA 9, 84 F.3d 334, 59 CrL 1187):
Lawfully obtained funds that are required by 31 USC 5316 to be reported to
U.S. Customs Service when they are transported out of United States are not
"instrumentality" of crime of failure to report, and, therefore, forfeiture of any
such funds pursuant to 18 USC 982(a) (1) for violation of Section 5316 would
violate Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.
Question presented: Is Section 982(a) (1) per se unconstitutional under Eighth
Amendment' s Excessive Fines Clause insofar as it subjects to criminal forfeiture
currency that is about to be transported out of United States without filing of
required report?
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96-1279 ROGERS V. U.S.
Ruling below (CA 11, 94 F.3d 1519, 60 CrL 1025):
Trial court's failure to instruct jury on element of offense is not "structural"
error and, under analysis of concurring opinion in Carella v. California, 491 U.S.
263 (1989), can be harmless beyond reasonable doubt if court can be confident that
it played no role in verdict; trial court's refusal to instruct jury that they could
convict defendant of possession of unregistered and unserialized silencer only if
he knew item was "firearn" as defined under National Firearms Act, 26 USC
5801-5972-which was erroneous in light of Staples v. U.S., 511 U.S. 600, 62 LW
4379 (1994)--was harmless under Carella standard in view of defendant's
admission at trial and in post-arrest interview, which was played for jury via
audiotape, that he knew item found in his truck was silencer.
Question presented: Is district court's failure to instruct jury on element of
offense harmless error when, at trial, defendant admitted that element?
96-6839 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES V. U.S.
Ruling below (CA 5, 8/22/96, unpublished):
U.S. v. Vasquez-Olvera, 999 F.3d 943, 53 CrL 1530 (CA 5 1993), which held
that 8 USC 1326(b) (2) -which provides stiffer sentence for alien's illegal re-entry
of country after deportation if deportation followed conviction for aggravated
felony-describes penalty enhancement rather than substantive offense, forecloses
contention by defendant who pleaded guilty to re-entry after deportation in
violation of Section 1326 that, although he was charged with and pleaded guilty
to simple re-entry in violation of Section 1326 (a), he was sentenced as if he had
pleaded guilty to re-entry following conviction for aggravated felony for purposes
of Section 1326(b)(2).
Question presented: Does sentencing court violate due process by determining
that Section 1326(b)(2) is not separate offense from Section 1326 (a) but merely
sentencing?
96-7171 SPENCER V. KEMNA
Ruling below (CA 8, 91 F.3d 1114):
Habeas corpus petition challenging parole revocation, filed by petitioner wh
ile incarcerated, was rendered moot by petitioner's subsequent release on parole
and his subsequent discharge from parole upon expiration of his sentences while
petition was pending, despite possible collateral consequences in future parole
hearings stemming from finding of prior parole violation.
Questions presented: (1) May state attorney general's office and district cour
t delay response and disposition in habeas corpus action until petitioner's claim
is arguably moot, and then rely on asserted mootness resulting from their delay to
deny relief? (2) Did court below err in holding--in conflict with Second, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits-that habeas corpus petition challenging parole revocation is
"moot," when petitioner was undisputedly in custody under color of revocation
when he filed petition?
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